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This paper outlines topic and research approach for my Masters’ Thesis in Geo-
political Studies supervised by RNDr. Jan Kofroň, Ph.D. at Charles University, Prague.
By conducting phronetic social science through a case study in connection to an
internship in Cairo, Egypt I entitle my thesis The ‘left-behind’. Poverty reduction,
conict prevention, peace building, ‘good governance’, . . . in informal urban settlements
of the planet’s most growing cities. A case study in Cairo, Egypt The thesis’ goal is to
answer the following research question: How to achieve better living conditions for
the ‘left-behind’ in face of an increasing scale and speed of planetary urbanisation and
the lack of willingness and ability of local and national governments to provide needed
resources?
1 Context
In connection to the diculties to ascertain the borders of Political Geography (e.g.,
Virginie Mamadouh 2003; Painter 2003), there exists an ongoing debate about the
conceptualisation of terminologies such as space, place, and territory (e.g., Cox 2001;
Elden 2010, 2005). In this context, the question remains how research is capable
of dealing with challenges modern (sometimes claimed post-modern) society has
to face in view of a planet that, on the one hand, becomes more interconnected,
and, on the other hand, whose vanishing borders create new ones, and wherein the
city/state dierentiation become fuzzier and fuzzier (e.g., Taylor 2000, 2007). There are
standpoints which claim (a) the importance of the local for debating these challenges
because scales themselves are not easily distinguishable anymore; (b) geopolitics must
consider security issues on the micro-scale; and (c) planetary urbanisation causes
physical space to become more and more operationalised for the wealth of very
specic and limited parts of the world (Virgine Mamadouh, Kramsch and Velde 2004;
Fregonese 2012; Brenner 2014; Brenner and Keil 2014).
In fact, we are confronted with a more and more populated and urbanised planet
(un-Habitat 2012; United Nations 2014) which is struggling hard to ensure environ-
mental, resource, climate, health, and human security (Engelke 2013). Challenges
concentrate in the manifestation of inequality in urban informal settlements, often
referred to as ‘slums’ (Davis 2004, 2007) but the roots of the problem are not restric-
ted to the local scale. Concurrently, the transformation of developing countries to
developed countries causes the new ‘emerging middle class’, originally suering too,
to eventually become self-aware and striving for additional demands which create
tensions in urban space (Balbo 2014); an issue which must be faced not only on the
∗36195365@fsv.cuni.cz
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local but also the national level, according to Balbo (2014, p. 282). In a similar man-
ner, Fainstein (2014) emphasises that municipalities are not capable of facing these
challenges alone and she tries to raise a discourse about justice in cities in general.
Indications of eorts to ght against inequalities in cities are partnerships such as
The Cities Alliance (2014) which try to incorporate dierent types of stakeholders
on multiple scales and share knowledge within an international network of cities,
institutions, and governments. Thus, population growth makes us face a variety
of local, regional, and global challenges which require action and collaboration on
multiple scales too.
The importance of the discourse mentioned above notwithstanding, from my point
of view, there is an immediate need for research-based analysis and intervention
which broaches the issue of unequal development and its manifestation in informal
urban settlements around the world. I do not want to raise apocalyptic arguments,
such as Ehrlich (1995). However, although there are voices stating that, relatively seen,
the amount of people living under inhuman conditions in informal urban settlements
is decreasing, the absolute numbers are increasing (un-Habitat 2012), frightening and
require emancipatory research approaches which result in concrete improvements of
living conditions at their very end. ‘As it has ironically been stressed, un statisticians
succeeded overnight where governments, aid agencies, nance institutions and ngos
had failed for decades, pulling out of their miserable housing conditions tens of
millions of slum dwellers’ (Balbo 2014, p. 278). This is why I urge the cause not to be
raised on paper only but demand Political Science and Geography to give guidance
in nally causing improvements and stimulations for action (cf. Schram, Flyvbjerg
and Landman 2013); the idea is to refract paradigmatic prejudices concerning spheres
of responsibility because they hinder sustainable development, e.g., epitomised by
Virgine Mamadouh, Kramsch and Velde (2004, p. 460):
[. . .] statistics generally pertaining to the national scale are inadequate to grasp the complex-
ity of the local eects of the globalisation process. Policies of liberalisation and deregulation
have led to the re-scaling of uneven development. Governments have been pre-occupied
with growth and have supported growth regions, but they should not neglect economic
social and political costs of uneven development and spatial planning as an instrument to
deal with them.
2 Methodology
To put under scrutiny the prevailing habits connected to these challenges, I decide for
an emancipatory way of philosophical grounding and research methodology. By using
critical realism as ontological and epistemological groundwork, I intend to set the
necessary cornerstones for pursuing so-called phronetic inquiry (see below). Although
I consider the risk of combining two of such heavily theoretical structures, I see the
need for setting an ontological and epistemological base for phronetic social science.
This is because the approach remains silent about its underlying philosophy. Yet, as
an emancipatory Weltanschauung, and tolerant to dierent types of methodological
approaches, I assert critical realism as an ideal philosophical counterpart. Here, I
refer to Sayer (1992, pp. 4, 5-6, 7, 14) who emphasises the triangle of method, object,
and purpose; epitomises characteristics of critical realism; claims to originate from
‘interdisciplinary studies of [. . .] urban and regional systems, in which researchers
tend to come from geography, sociology, [. . .] political science’; and argues that
knowledge is about knowing ‘how to do something’. Further, not to go beyond the
2
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scope of this proposal concerning the philosophical foundations alone, I lastly mention
critical realism’s demand for normative research (Sayer 1997, p. 476). These aspects
combined fall in my own ontological and epistemological standpoint, mirror the ideas
of phronetic social science, and enhance the latter with a so far missing ontology and
epistemology as philosophical base.
Flyvbjerg (2009) argues that social sciences are dierent from natural sciences per
se and, therefore, require a new course of research. His claim is based on the discovery
of three terms originally coined by Aristotle (Flyvbjerg 2009, p. 57): episteme, techne,
and phronesis. According to Flyvbjerg, episteme and techne found their representation
in today’s philosophy of science whereas phronesis remains missing. Since their
entirety is asserted as necessary for successful scientic inquiry, the lack of phronesis
questions the current modus operandi of the social sciences. Thus, Flyvbjerg oers
a new research approach called ‘phronetic social science’. It is constituted by three
pillars which are: four key questions, nine methodological guidelines, and the concept
of “tension points”. Here, the most important to mention are the four power questions
(Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram 2012b, p. 5): Where are we going with a specic
problematic? Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanism of power? Is this
development desirable? What, if anything, should we do about it? However there
is much more to say about the other two pillars, not to go beyond the scope of this
document, I summarise phronetic research as follows: The notion is to answer the
four key questions with the help of the guidelines; to nd tensions points while
undertaking this inquiry; to actively stimulate a dialogue about the ndings and the
object of study; and to challenge dominant habits associated within uncovered power
relations (Flyvbjerg 2004, 2012; Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram 2012a). This paves
the way for two ideas: eventually shifting social research from theory and discourse to
praxis and action; and, thereby, set it apart from the natural sciences. Although I see
the phronetic approach as an ideal method for my research, I support the argument
of Soja (2013) who uncovers a crucial decit of phronetic inquiry: its lack of spatiality.
Hence, Soja (2013, p. 753) demands that ‘phronesis from the start needs to be seen
as simultaneously social, historical, and spatial’. However, so far ‘one of the most
signicant unexplored elds of phronetic social science [. . .] [is its application] to
urban spatial causality and the generative eects of urban agglomeration’ (Soja 2013,
p. 755). But concentrating on ‘inequality, hierarchy, and injustice’, according to Soja,
is ‘a key step in the spatialization of phronetic social science’ and important for
the future development of phronetic inquiry. Since these are key components in my
prospective research, next to its thematic contribution, my inquiry also puts phronetic
social science on its way forward.
Two main reasons call for case study research. First, as argued by Flyvbjerg
(2006), case study research is a perfect way of inquiry to simultaneously gain valuable
specic and general knowledge, and, as shown in another example (Flyvbjerg, Holm
and Buhl 2002), perfectly suits phronetic research. Second, I have the opportunity
to work as an intern in the ‘Participatory development programme in urban areas’
executed by GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) in Cairo,
Egypt1 which oers me the opportunity to benet from practical insights in the modus
operandi of programs which try to tackle the challenges outlined above. Additionally,
throughout the internship, I will gain direct experience of the situation in informal
urban settlements. I consider the location and the particular development program
itself ideal for investigations because of the following facts: In Greater Cairo more than
1For further information about the project please consult giz (2015) and pdp (2015).
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twelve million people live in informal urban settlements (Amnesty International 2011,
p. 1) which have been causing challenges in a variety of realms (e.g, El-Batran and
Arandel 1998; Siou 1981). Because of controversies in connection to the measurement
of poverty in Cairo the case is a tting example for the ongoing debate about new
conceptualisations of ‘poverty’ for post-2015 (Lang and Lingnau 2015; Melamed 2015;
Sabry 2010), the development policy proposed for the time after the deadline of the
Millennium Development Goals. In addition, Cairo is embedded into a region of
recent turmoils and, thus, of geopolitical concern (e.g., Anderson 2011; Daloucara
2012; Ramadan 2013). Concerning the development program, it must be noted that it
can be considered unique, and thus especially interesting to investigate, because it
intervenes on multiple scales. In this context, the program was successful cooperating
with three ministries of the Greater Cairo region, facilitated the foundation of a
Ministry of Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements which became responsible not
only for Cairo but entire Egypt (giz 2015). Concluding, the case is connected to
multiple topics which are debated within the realm of my prospective thesis as well
as the eld of Political Geography in general.
3 Content
The research I conduct is lead by the following main research question: How to achieve
better living conditions for the ‘left-behind’ in face of an increasing scale and speed of
planetary urbanisation and the lack of willingness and ability of local and national
governments to provide needed resources? An answer to the question I attempt to nd
by structuring it into four sub-questions inspired by phronetic inquiry. Following this
approach my prospective thesis will include a chapter concerning the chosen meth-
odology which is an in-depth description of the method mentioned above, thereby,
argues for more political and spatial Political Geography, and explains key concepts;2
the main part of the thesis is divided according to the four sub-questions into (a) a
recapitulation of the status quo, (b) an analysis of the dominant power distribution,
(c) a swot analysis, and (d) recommendations; nally, the last part summarises and
concludes the paper by giving an answer to the main research question.
In general, I consider the case study an institutional and socio-spatial analysis
because of the direction the ‘power questions’ of phronetic social science point to and
the interplay of society and space within Political Geography (cf. Soja 1980; Harvey
2008). The section status quo is lead by the question Where are we going with the
development of informal urban settlements in Cairo? Thereby, it sets the particular case
of Cairo into the international framework of development cooperation and locates
Cairo’s role within the concept of planetary urbanisation. The idea is to pursue
inquiry on the macro and micro scale. In the section power distribution I answer the
question Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? This part of the
thesis focuses on the local dimensions of the issue, investigates the power relations
of important actors, and uncovers the consequences of prevailing habits for space. In
the swot analysis, investigation is lead by the question Is this development desirable?
Here, I discover strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the status quo
so-far presented in the thesis. Final recommendations respond to What, if anything,
should we do about it? While especially focusing on the interplay of action on dierent
scales, here, the idea is to give institutional and socio-spatial advice. The nal part of




the prospective thesis answers to the main research question How to achieve better
living conditions for the ‘left-behind’ in face of an increasing scale and speed of planetary
urbanisation and the lack of willingness and ability of local and national governments
to provide needed resources? Throughout this chapter, the methodological input and
the contributions to the particular case study are summarised.
To conclude, my future inquiry presents an emancipatory way of facing the
demands an increasing population growth and planetary urbanisation sets by con-
ducting a phronetic case study in Cairo, Egypt. In addition, throughout the inquiry,
I tackle a major decit of phronetic social science. Furthermore, I see the proposed
inquiry capable of providing practical guidance to improve the living conditions of
‘the left-behind’.
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The human population is growing and our cities are becoming increasingly populated
(United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2012). ‘Urbanisation’ is a phenomenon
that has been known to us since the time of the Industrial Revolution. This represented
a time when settlement patterns changed, when people left their homes in rural areas
and the majority of the population started to live in the city. Today, this movement
not only aects western states but the entire world. Because of this, recent studies
suggest that contemporary society faces a similar but peculiar challenge called ‘plan-
etary urbanisation’ (Brenner 2014a, emphasis by me). Today, not only the amount of
people living in the world’s biggest cities rises, also certain geographical areas are
operationalised for the benet and wealth of others. As argued, this development causes
inequalities between dierent parts of society world-wide and a permanent struggle
to ensure environmental, resource, climate, health, and human security (Harvey 2006;
Engelke 2013).
The sites of informal urban settlements, sometimes referred to as ‘slums,’ allegorise
world-wide inequalities in cities in physical space and demonstrate that it is still an
ongoing struggle to face contemporary forms of urbanisation (see Davis 2004). Con-
cerning this challenge, scholars infer that local municipalities and regional actors alone
are incapable of engaging with the prevalent situation; rather, they stress the need
of political decisions taken on multiple administrative levels, that is, from local to
global (see Balbo 2013; Fainstein 2014). Thus, numerous developing countries benet
from donor funding to improve the living conditions of the aected population co-
operatively. The increasing eorts of donors could suggest that they address the fact
that such environments have been left-behind. But observers are of the opinion that a
decreasing amount of resources reach those impoverished because frameworks for aid
are ineective (Kharas 2007).
An example of this dilemma is the Participatory Development Programme operated by
the German association Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (‘Association for
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International Co-operation’) in Cairo, Egypt. Since its establishment in 1998, the project
has been engaging with multiple administrative levels of the metropolitan area. At the
moment, the European Union, in parallel to the German state and the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation, provides most of the nancial contribution. The overall aim of the
donor support is to improve the living conditions of those left-behind (see Gesellschaft
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit Egypt 2015). Thus, we witness a complex system of
actors, each originating from and addressing dierent administrative levels, all ghting
for the wealth of others in dierent spaces. However, research about participatory
development co-operation in general, and this programme in particular, are highly
critical of these eorts, as outcomes remain absent (see Dill 2009; Mohan and Stokke
2000; Piero 2009).
In light of this dilemma I asked myself: how can living conditions of ‘the left-behind’
be improved in the face of both an increasing scale and speed of planetary urbanisation
and the lack of willingness and/or ability of local, national, international, governmental,
and non-governmental organisations to provide needed and essential resources? I read
this question not with substantive but meta-theoretical concerns in mind. How can
academia translate concerns about prevalent geographico-political phenomena into
substantive actions? How can academia legitimate a normative momentum in their
research outcomes? Moreover, how can academia ascertain whether the proposed
measures will actually improve and not impair the situation addressed?
Although social scientists, from Max Weber to Michel Foucault, all intend to produce
socially relevant work (see for example Gerring 2015), disputes prevail regarding how
to do so and which ontology to use while researching. Voices reect a wide range from
radical neopositivist to postmodernist standpoints. This dilemma we also encounter
in political geography, where scientic endeavours span from contributions of the
neorealist camp to the camp of critical geopoliticians respectively. The situation is even
worsened by the complexity and elusiveness of the geographico-political phenomena
that researchers of the eld engage in.
The purpose of the thesis is to scrutinise this uncertainty and propose a solution.
By combining young and innovative approaches of the philosophy of social science
with mature but overlooked contributions of the eld, the research aims to illuminate a
novel meta-theoretical territory that overcomes the aforementioned doubts. This will
help political geographers to provide solutions not only for the case in Cairo but the
meta-theoretical dilemma overall.
3
The thesis will take us on a journey from the most abstract to the most concrete.
In the rst chapter we discuss the philosophy of social science in general to relate
it to debates in political geography and international relations. In this context we
elaborate on key aspects that the proposed approach must engage with. In the second
chapter, we reconsider the original core of critical realism. Its philosophical ontology
(transcendental realism) will help us to develop a sound metaphysics for everything
geographico-political. In the third chapter, we encounter phronetic social science as
epistemological and methodological add-on to the social sciences to become socially
valuable.
In the fourth chapter, we get acquainted with the French tradition around géopoli-
tiques and develop the proposed research programme. Considering géopolitiques, we
will arrive at an understanding of ‘geopolitics’ that is more encompassing than the
Anglophone one. This will assist in synthesising critical realism and phronetics in a
research programme that I call ‘transcendental phronetic political geography.’ It can
address phenomena that relate to the highly debated concepts of power, space, scale,
and justice that are of concern in socio-spatial inequalities as described above. It is
an umbrella term for critical and emancipatory research in political geography. In the
same chapter we discuss the compatibility of the chosen ideas, demarcate the proposed
programme from other approaches, and argue for its applicability.
The fth and last chapter applies transcendental phronetic political geography
to the Participatory Development Programme in Cairo incipiently . This chapter, in
virtue of critical realism, incorporates an explanatory critique and, with phronesis in
mind, discloses the power relations that maintain the current situation by applying an
‘analyse systemique,’ as French geopoliticians say. By doing so, I further clarify how the
developed approach can translate into practice. At the end of the thesis the entire work
is discussed. It follows a debate about the aws of the proposed research programme
and a discussion of its future cornerstones.

Chapter 1
State of aairs in the philosophy of social science
The following chapter explains why the pursuit of social inquiry is a dicult endeavour.
The argument goes that these diculties make it impossible for social scientists to
pursue research like natural scientists. Although this fact is appreciated in contemporary
philosophy, there remain disagreements about these diculties in applied social sciences.
We will discuss the dierent standpoints within these inconclusive debates.
The main aim of this chapter is to contextualise the meta-theoretical concerns of
the disciplines in question: political geography, geopolitics, and international relations.
This will enable us to address them with the help of critical realism in the next chapter.
1.1 A very short introduction to philosophy
In principle, the questions that are raised within the eld of philosophy can be structured
into three main branches: axiology, which can itself be divided into ethics and aesthetics;
metaphysics which includes ontology; and epistemology (Archie 2007).
Throughout the thesis we will mainly deal with metaphysical, epistemological,
and ethical questions. Metaphysical questions are: What is there and how is it like?
What exists and how is it structured? More precisely, these are questions departing
from ontology. The distinction between metaphysics and ontology originates from
the broadening of metaphysics in the seventeenth century. By pursuing ontology, we
address the science of being and nothing else (van Inwagen and Sullivan 2015). On
the contrary, epistemology is, literally, the study of knowledge and ‘the creation and
dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry’ (Steup 2014; Truncellito
2015). A scholar who is concerned about epistemology asks: What do we know about
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the world and how can we know more about it? What is the best attempt to increase our
knowledge about the world? And what does it mean ‘to know more’ about something?
In comparison, the eld of ethics tries to answer the questions: What is right and
what is wrong in terms of human behaviour? What is ‘human,’ that is, how should we
react and behave? The arguments following in this work mainly concern normative
and applied ethics. Normative ethics implies the idea to nally reach a level of ‘moral
standards that regulate right and wrong conduct,’ while applied ethics engages with
specic practical issues of human life (Fieser 2015). Although ethical questions have
been asked for millennia, there is no ultimate answer to them (which we will deal with
later).
The tradition that poses ontological, epistemological, and ethical questions toward
dierent disciplines in science is called ‘philosophy of science.’ There, scholars ask
what makes an inquiry scientic, how such inquiry can be achieved best, and what
the purpose of science is. While it is dicult to clearly demarcate these traditions,
Monteiro and Ruby (2009) outline that three main foundational standpoints have been
developing over the course of history: instrumentalism, social constructivism, and
scientic realism. Likewise, Bhaskar (1998a, 19-23) dierentiates between classical
empiricism, transcendental idealism, and his philosophy: transcendental realism.
Each of these streams relates ontology to epistemology dierently. Instrumentalism
and social constructivism give more weight to epistemology. Their ontology is ‘at’
(Benton and Craib 2011) because both base their arguments on empirical realism, as
Bhaskar (1998a, 21) notes. As we will see, the situation in transcendental realism is
completely dierent because its focus lies on ontology. The dierences of the three
streams make the philosophy of science a very contested environment.
1.2 The diculties of social inquiry
The philosophy of science is more relevant for social scientists than for natural scientists.
It helps us to investigate whether our inquiries are successful or not, thus, whether we
should decrease, maintain, or increase our eorts in pursuing them. Here, the stance of
the natural sciences is superior than the one of the social sciences because the former
demonstrates its success with ease whereas the latter struggles to do so. This is for two
reasons: Firstly, natural scientists have been improving our power to control the world,
that is, to use the natural world for our benets through technological innovation; and
1.2. The diculties of social inquiry 7
secondly, the theories we develop in the natural sciences ‘tend to increase in depth,
range and predictive power’ (Gorton 2015). On the contrary, comparable achievements
generally lack in the social sciences. Because of this, scholars scrutinise the eorts we
put into social inquiry. Such scrutinising is done in a discipline that is called philosophy
of social science (see for example Benton and Craib 2011; Risjord 2014; Rosenberg 2016).
In his introduction Risjord (2014, 7) claims that discussions within the philosophy
of social science mainly concern naturalism, reductionism, and normativity. Our stand-
point in regard to these notions aects what we think the social sciences are about,
expect from it, and thus, how we pursue social research. Although the debates seem
highly theoretical and detached from practical relevance, what is at stake are the over-
all reliability and acceptance of social inquiries in academia. Some go even as far as
questioning ‘whether or how the study of human social behaviour is scientic’ at all
(Fay 2010, 1046).
Next to this fundamental doubt, our standpoint in disputes about naturalism, re-
ductionism, and normativity also aects our attitude toward the role of prediction and
values in social research. Depending on the standpoint we take, we give them a more
or less important stance in our research projects. As the next sections show, in the
philosophy of social science prediction and values are continuously made topic – and
are especially relevant for the disciplines the thesis focuses on: political geography and
international relations.
1.2.1 Naturalism: equalising natural and social sciences
According to naturalism, there shall be made no dierence between the natural and social
sciences and social scientists shall emulate natural scientists to replicate the success of
the discipline. In this context, we can distinguish between ontological naturalism and
epistemological naturalism (Risjord 2014, 8-9). Ontological naturalism demands that
we investigate the same entities in the social sciences as we do in the natural sciences.
According to this standpoint, there is no dierence between investigating humans and
their behaviour, or for example planets and their movements. Epistemological naturalism
holds that the modus operandi of research in social sciences must be the same as the
one we pursue in natural sciences, that is, the methods we use in the latter we must
also use in the former. Scholars of both positions argue that the social sciences must
reect the natural sciences, otherwise human sciences could not be successful.
Extreme forms of naturalism are empiricism and positivism. They presuppose that
only ‘nature is the order of things accessible to us through observation and the methods
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of the empirical sciences’ (Jacobs 2015). According to empiricism, the answer to the
question ‘what is there and what is it like?’ goes ‘there is everything that can be
observed and it is like we observe it’ which makes it a very ‘at ontology’ (Benton and
Craib 2011).
These assumptions were developed by positivists to prove that all human knowledge
can be inferred from sensory information (Roth 2010). In this context the leading gure
is Auguste Comte who was the rst to coin the term positivism (Gorton 2015; cf. Murzi
2010). It can be seen as the starting point of the epistemological dimension of empiricism.
Positivists argue that ‘meaningful statements about the world are limited to those that
can be tested through direct observing’ (Gorton 2015). Positivism is a diverse tradition,
but what all forms of it have in common is regularity, determinism, and system closure
(Steinmetz 2005, 31-35).
Likewise, naturalists disagree about what makes an adequate methodology within
science but some key characteristics of naturalism can be outlined. According to
Gorton (2015) we can claim that naturalism mainly supports three notions (cf. Jacobs
2015; Benton and Craib 2011, 23): First, science must be empirical; second, its goal
is to produce causal explanations; and third, scientists are prohibited to make value
judgements. These aspects make science distinguishable from non-science in the sense
that they establish standards of scientic inquiry. One of the most prominent examples
of authors who tried to establish such standards is Karl Popper. By introducing his
concept of empirical falsiability, he claimed that, although we can never make sure
that our theories are true, we can at least claim their truth until we are able to falsify
them through theory testing.
The idea to produce causal explanations resembles the attempt to produce law-like
regularities, that is, theories that are as simple and as general as possible while explaining
the broadest scope of dierent types of events. The third notion, the neglect of values,
implies the idea that ‘[s]cience can help us better understand how to manipulate the
social world to help us achieve our goals, but it cannot tell us what those goals ought to
be’ (Gorton 2015) which is inherently connected to David Hume’s claim that ‘proper’
science prohibits scholars to include an ‘ought.’
By relying on empiricism and positivism, naturalists emphasise that only sciences
can produce knowledge (Benton and Craib 2011, 23). Scientic knowledge is considered
genuine and the highest aim possible to reach through human mental endeavour. In
accordance with naturalism, empiricism and positivism, they stress that the social
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sciences are obligated to emulate the natural sciences. By doing so, the claim is that we
will nally come to a stage when our achievements through natural inquiries enable
us to control and shape the social world. This notion, often referred to as ‘social
engineering,’ is comparable to the natural sciences’ goal to control the natural world
through technology. In hope for similar technological advancements, according to
naturalists, success in the social sciences is possible as long as we stick to the path
chosen by naturalists.
But is naturalism the way to go in the social sciences? And does such an attempt
really guarantee success? No, because there is great evidence to refrain from emulating
the ontology and epistemology of the natural sciences.
Concerning ontology, we can argue that the objects under study in the social
world are inherently dierent from those in the natural world. On the contrary to
natural objects and the naturalists’ claim, humans are conscious and aware of their
consciousness (28). Because of this, they act with reason; their actions get meaning.
On the contrary to humans, atoms and planets move because they are caused to do
so by other phenomena (Fay 2010, 1046; Gorton 2015).1 Trying to circumvent the
unpredictability of humans, social scientists have developed the idea of a ‘rational
actor’ who acts according to several principles. However, humans tend not to behave
rationally per se (Fay 2010, 1049; Gorton 2015). Hence, in the social and natural world,
we seem to deal with dierent objects of study. Since people are self-aware and fallible,
the at ontology of empiricism is insucient.
Concerning epistemology, a naturalist ontology makes a lot of scientic advance-
ments unexplainable because it accepts only what we can perceive empirically. Since
research requires creativity and the capability to imagine the unobservable, we must
take the unobservable seriously. However, empiricism is incapable of explaining our
ability to conceptualise models that we have been initially unaware of because it lacks
the unobservable. Again, the narrowness of the naturalist ontology hampers our at-
tempts to better understand the world – social and natural (Benton and Craib 2011,
31-34). We will discuss this objection in more detail in the next chapter too.
Further objections include the claim that it is impossible to infer any law-like
regularities in the social sciences. The argument is that the complexity of the social
1. Causation is a term full of meaning in the philosophy of science. The positivists camp equalises
causation with the regularity of events. According to them, if we witness an event under particular
conditions several times, we can ascertain that we discovered a causal law. In the next chapter we will
question this standpoint in more depth.
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world makes the pursuit of controlled experiments dicult. Maybe because of the
youth of the social sciences, social laws are usually ‘imprecise, exception ridden and
time-bound or place-bound rather than precise and universal’ (Gorton 2015). Thus,
an idealisation of the conditions, as it is done in the hypothetico-deductive model
of naturalists (Benton and Craib 2011), is hard, and generating social theories that
propagate laws remains dicult (Fay 2010, 1048).
These are only some of the many objections to naturalism. However, they already
show that we cannot simply impose the ideas of the natural sciences on the social
sciences. Although we can learn a lot from the philosophy of science, it seems necessary
to develop a unique philosophy of social science that is capable of addressing the special
needs of social studies.
1.2.2 Reductionism: the whole is the accumulation of its parts
As it is the case with naturalism, we can distinguish between ontological and epi-
stemological reductionism (Risjord 2014, 10), and additionally demarcate theoretical
reductionism (Ney 2015). In all cases, ‘to reduce’ means that one idea, concept, or
entity can be replaced or compensated by another because the latter enables us to
explain more with less eort. (In light of this, we see that reductionism shares some
notions with naturalism. Nevertheless, reductionism do not need to be an inherent
part of naturalism.) In this section, we will rst take a look on the dierent forms of
reductionism, and subsequently depict objections against it.
Ontological reductionists claim that every system or structure can be reduced to its
smallest parts. This implies that everything in the entire universe can be reduced to a
nite amount of very small particles. Epistemological reductionists claim that once we
are able to understand the smallest particles we can also understand the system they
constitute. They argue that there is no need to study the bigger structure; rather, we are
doing our best to understand the world by describing the smallest parts as best as we
can. In a similar manner, theoretical reductionists infer that one theory can be replaced
by another more general and simpler theory. In accordance to this, ‘more fundamental’
disciplines will eventually supersede ‘less fundamental’ disciplines. Thus, sociology
will be superseded by psychology; psychology by biology; biology by chemistry; and
nally, chemistry will be reduced to physics. Concluding, some scholars claim that
every concern of any scientic discipline can be explained through physics at some
point (Benton and Craib 2011, 127).
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However, conceptualisations such as ‘multiple realisability,’ ‘emergence,’ and ‘su-
pervenience’ question the feasibility of reductionism. ‘Multiple realisation’ means that
for a specic, for example social or non-physical phenomenon, there exist a variety of
physical conditions that would satisfy the non-physical phenomenon and vice versa.
To consider the example given by Ney (2015) in reference to Putnam and Fodor, ‘is in
pain’ can be constituted through many physical phenomena but the very same physical
phenomena can also implicate a non-physical phenomenon that is dierent from ‘is
in pain.’ Thus, we ‘would not be able to nd true identity statements linking special
science predicates with predicates from physical science’ (Ney 2015). According to
Jaworski (2015), multiple realisability is based on three premises: First, mental types
are multiply realisable; second, if mental types are multiple realisable, then they are not
identical to physical types; third, if mental types are not identical to physical types, then
psychological discourse (vernacular or scientic) is not reducible to physical theory.
When we speak of emergence, we talk about the idea that a novel phenomenon may
materialise (physically or meta-physically) from complex systems (social structures)
that we, in respect to their internal structure, would not have thought of in the stage of
pre-materialisation (Vintiadis 2015). In this context, scholars distinguish between strong
and weak or ontological and epistemological emergence (Vintiadis 2015; cf. O’Connor
and Wong 2015). While strong emergence infers that the novelty of the new phenomena
causes irreducibility, and, further, that new phenomena may inuence the phenomenon
it emerged from; weak emergence only puts emphasis on the unpredictability of the
‘materialisation’ of the novel phenomenon in the stage of pre-materialisation. Hence,
both types of emergence oppose to ontological and epistemological reductionism re-
spectively. This makes emergence is an unexplainable phenomenon by proponents of
ontological and epistemological reductionism.
In the case of supervenience, the idea is to describe a relationship between two
properties that is complementary to the concept of determination. It is dened as
follows (Rickles 2015):
For two sets of properties, A (the supervenient set) and B (the subvenient set or super-
venience base), A supervenes on B just in case there can be no dierence in A without a
dierence in B.
Without going too much into detail of the logical implications and the debates
around it, supervenience shares some similarities with multiple realisability. For ex-
ample, if a non-physical phenomenon supervenes on a physical phenomenon and the
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latter changes, because of its supervenient character, the former does not need to change
necessarily. However, if the non-physical phenomenon (the supervenient set) changes,
the physical phenomenon (the subvenient set) must change necessarily. In other words,
the relationship between A and B is rather fuzzy than explicit. Thus, supervenience
describes a ‘dependency weaker than identity and reduction’ (Rickles 2015) In some
instances, a change of the subvenient property is detached from changes of the super-
venient property. Whether supervenience makes reductionism impossible or not is
debatable (Rickles 2015; cf. McLaughlin 1997). Anyway, it becomes clear that sustaining
reductionism is complicated.
Concluding, reductionism would, if it was possible, simplify our ontological and
epistemological understanding of the world. But philosophers of the social sciences
have been revealing that there are a variety of diculties. The arguments of proponents
of multiple realisability, emergence, and supervenience demonstrate that ontological,
epistemological, and theoretical reductionism has its limits. We will further discuss
these notions in the next chapter when we deal with so-called ‘stratication.’
1.2.3 Normativity: what we ought to do
As stated above, proponents of positivism and empiricism remain indierent about
values and concentrate on facts solely. This is not only because abstract concepts such as
ideas or beliefs are considered unimportant for scientic inquiry (as long as they are not
causal factors) and, therefore, can be excluded from investigation; further, as epitomised
by Gorton (2015) in connection to naturalism, the goal of scientic endeavour is to
produce causal explanations while avoiding value judgements (remember Hume’s claim
not to deduce an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’). However, certain aspects in the social sciences
are dicult to think of without values. ‘[C]oncepts [such as “democracy” and “peace”]
cannot be dened in ways that are completely independent of political values’ (Risjord
2014, 7). Further, as argued by Risjord, conceptualising both ‘fact’ and ‘value’ remains
complicated and makes our attempt to adequately deal with these notions in the social
sciences even more dicult.
In this context, Marx’s remark in his Thesis on Feuerbach is often mentioned as an
example for the establishment of an emancipatory social science (for example in Gorton
2015; Fay 2010; Joll 2015). Such a pursuit is, according to him, capable not only of
interpreting but changing the world which is even one step further than interpretivism
goes. Such an attitude toward the purpose of social science diminishes both the positivst
understanding of scientic inquiry and our standpoint as neutral and/or objective
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observers of the world (Fay 2010, 1050). According to proponents of these critical ideas,
we should ‘aim at enhancing [the] understanding of our world rather than merely
enhancing our powers of prediction and technical control’ (Gorton 2015). All of this
makes social inquiry a deeply political enterprise.
The idea to consider social inquiry a political enterprise can be put even further.
In the context of ‘social engineering,’ Michel Foucault stated that what is considered
truth is declared by power relations within society (Gorton 2015; Benton and Craib
2011, 49). Likewise, value neutrality is seen as an ideology which helps social science
‘to legitimate and reinforce oppressive values, beliefs, and practices and thereby mask
domination’ (Gorton 2015). For the sake of liberation and emancipation the oppression
shall be breached. With his line of argument, Foucault founded a novel stream of
thought that has many proponents today and is known as ‘postmodernism,’ sometimes
‘poststructuralism.’ Scholars of these types of approaches maintain objections to more
traditional attempts of social inquiry. Their good intentions notwithstanding, extreme
forms of postmodernism or poststructuralism can be understood as ‘philosophical
ideologies’ (Benton and Craib 2011, 175) themselves and are highly criticised because
they make scientic inquiry (nearly) impossible, according to its critics.
I do not intend to start a debate about the legitimacy of postmodern or poststruc-
turalist approaches but to raise the concern that neglecting values and prohibiting
normative notions in scientic works can be problematic. Proponents of the normative
account within the social sciences argue that ‘cultural norms and values cannot be
disentangled from scientic knowledge-claims’ (44). In addition, Hume’s claim that one
may not derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is,’ by and of itself, is a normative statement, thus
self-contradictory. In other words, ‘the view of science as the pursuit of objective know-
ledge about the world itself implies value commitments’ (44) and, as written elsewhere,
normative orientations come with empirical ones (Mihic, Engelmann and Wingrove
2005, 476). Hence, instead of ignoring anything related to values and ensuring value
neutrality, we should understand ‘facticity and normativitiy as mutually supporting
grounds’ (477).
So, on the one hand, we have the idea of increasing our knowledge of the world
in terms of understanding the underlying causalities, and on the other hand, there
is the attempt to focus on the normative account of social science and its stance as
a political enterprise. Thus, although both facticity and normativity are considered
important, it seems dicult to combine both. While the naturalist side criticises value
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judgements, proponents of normativity object to the limitations of naturalism and
positivist approaches to social inquiry.
To conclude this section, instead of one clear line describing where to go in the philo-
sophy of social science, we saw diverse streams in both ontology and epistemology.
Each approach pursues studies in the social sciences dierently which makes it a di-
cult attempt to decide for the ‘right’ one. Next to this, it is also the idiosyncrasy of the
object under study which precipitates the complexity of social inquiries and increases
the diculty.
To circumvent these concerns, scholars have been trying to rely on naturalist views
which they hoped enable them to replicate the success of the natural sciences. In this
context, we further considered streams that are juxtaposed to these traditional attempts,
such as the critical school or postmodernism. Here, scholars argue that naturalist
approaches create knowledge regimes which harms liberal society. We addressed
the concern that postmodern approaches are often doomed entirely because they are
self-contradictory and make scientic inquiry (nearly) impossible. Yet, especially in
regard to normativity and the emancipatory character of the social sciences, they
provide noteworthy contributions and objections to the limitations of at ontologies
and epistemologies such as empiricism and positivism. Although these concerns are
plausible, there remain many authors who argue for naturalism and the primacy of
such and similar approaches in the social sciences.
Overall, this section juxtaposes the notion of propagating naturalist, empiricist,
positivist notions versus relative approaches such as interpretivism , the critical school,
postmodernism. In this context, we shortly discussed that attention is directed toward
law-nding, causation, and prediction on the one hand, and understanding, interpreting,
and meaning on the other hand. Further we considered dierent types of reductionism,
and in this context the idea that physical sciences will eventually supersede non-physical
sciences. However, as shown, simplifying scientic endeavour is dicult because of
notions such as emergence, multiple realisability, and supervenience. Finally, this lead
us to critical approaches which propagate inquiries that focus on the emancipatory
character of social inquiry. Rather than incorporating existing ideas in the philosophy of
social science, such attempts, in their extreme forms, condemn the scientic endeavour
at all because it is understood as a platform for the creation of knowledge regimes. Hence,
from a philosophical standpoint, we are trapped within several dierent ontological
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and epistemological understandings that try to convince us what the social sciences are
about; what makes social inquiry scientic; how such inquiry can be achieved best; and
what the purpose of the social sciences is.
1.3 Responses by geographico-political disciplines
Obviously, the aforementioned diculties nd echoes in disciplines that are more
applied than philosophy. When investigating the evolution of the geographico-political
discourse in academia from today’s standpoint, we see that the roots of both political
geography and geopolitics are tied together closely. When Friedrich Ratzel, who was
the rst to coin the term ‘Politische Geograe,’ and Rudolf Kjellen, who was the rst to
coin the term ‘Geopolitik,’ introduced their thinking close to the turning point of the
ninetieth to the twentieth century (Criekemans 2009), they were probably unaware of
the fact that they raised two siblings that would gain popularity as both a ‘good’ and a
‘bad’ example to think geography politically (Agnew 2002, 80-2).
In fact, geographers have been thinking politically throughout history. In the pre-
modern age, we have investigated maps to realise that nature compels states because
natural borders were too dicult to circumvent. In the modern age, we have concluded
that nature advises states, because we disclosed nature’s richness and natural borders
vanished (Kristof 1960, 10). So, our ideas were eventually misunderstood, and misused
to serve as rationale for an atrocious strategy of expansion by German politicians in
the rst half of the last century. In the aftermath, ‘Geopolitics,’ originally understood as
the conjunction of geographical and political thought, got condemned as an academic
eld, and its revival took decades while the eld of political geography has been busy
dissociating itself from its sibling (Hepple 1986; cf. Kristof 1960; Alexander 1961). Today,
in line with the spatial turn of the last decades (see Lossau and Lippuner 2004; Schlögel
2011; Warf and Arias 2009), contributions concerning everything that is geographico-
political are ourishing.
These contributions stem from the complexity of the object under study. As the
unappreciated2 introduction to the philosophy of geography by Varzi (2001) reveals,
the discipline must investigate structures that are rich in ontology and dicult to
distinguish. Geographers deal with objects whose boundaries are unclear, and are
2. Consulting the Web of Science reveals that Varzi (2001) has been cited seven times only as of May
2016.
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dicult to conceptualise (Smith 2001). Take for example mountains (where does a
mountain begin or end?), riverbanks that change permanently, or the diculty to dene
whether one deals with a forest or an agglomeration of trees. Conceptual vagueness
is very well known to the geographer. In addition, geographers address both physical
and social phenomena. For example, national borders are social interventions, but only
visible physically where humans manifested them in physical space. Yet, in the social
space they are permanently visible in culture, identity, language et cetera. Thus, the
physical and the social space are interconnected, as most prominently discussed by
Lefebvre ([1991] 2014), and in political geography applied in inquiries of the French
school that we will encounter later.
The divide of the discipline into physical and human geography underlines the
ontological complexity. On the one hand, it epitomises the variety of dierent attempts
to deal with geography’s rich ontology that spans from natural to social phenomena.
On the other hand, every divide inherently separates scholars of one type from those of
another type, and whether these co-operate is questionable (Viles 2005).
The elusiveness of geographico-political phenomena is also evident in dierent
approaches that are pursued in sub-disciplines of geography. The relation between
political geography and geopolitics is intangible (Lossau 2002) while both live at the
very edge of human geography (Taylor 2000a). In an article concerning the politics of
political geography, Mamadouh (2003) argues that it lacks a central core. The discipline
suers from a complex structure of sub-disciplines while scholars struggle to demarcate
the eld from others (see also Painter 2003). Concurrently, political geography has
its centre in the Anglophone world which makes scholars tend to ignore innovative
approaches that are written in other languages than English (see also Sidaway 2008).
Similar elusiveness we also encounter in geopolitics (Bassin et al. 2004) where academics
try to cope with ‘messy’ geopolitical contexts (Flint 2006, 189). Scholars who try to
understand space share standpoints that range from those of critical geopolitics to those
of the neorealist school of international relations (Kofroň 2012). Mamadouh (2003, 672)
concludes (see also Agnew 2003):
Political geography needs not closure, in terms of determining which topics and themes
should be addressed and in which places, but clarication about specic tools, both
concepts and methodologies.
Yet, the situation is rather dierent. In the last section we saw that the diculty of
social inquiry is connected to three key concepts: naturalism, reductionism, and norm-
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ativity. These are also visible in human geography where scholars dierentiate between
positivist, humanistic, and structuralist approaches mainly (Johnston 1986). Notions
of naturalism and reductionism are noticeable in the positivist approach of human
geography. Humanistic approaches challenge this standpoint and try to emancipate the
object they study by increasing their understanding of the individual. Structuralism
reverses reductionism. We see, the key concepts of the philosophy of social science
reoccur in human geography. And, as in the philosophical debates, scholars have been
questioning the scientic character of approaches in human geography (Hickey and
Lawson 2005).
Debates around naturalism, reductionism, and normativity are also present in more
specialised sub-disciplines such as political geography. Although scholars struggle to
disentangle the discipline, it can be divided into three streams: the spatial analytic
perspective, the political-economic perspective, and the postmodern approach (Agnew,
Mitchell and Toal 2003; 4; Mamadouh 2004, 432) – each of them being accompanied by
the ever-arising debate whether the nation-state is the most important political actor or
not (see Herb 2008). How do the streams reect the debates of the philosophy of social
science? The spatial analytic perspective is a naturalist approach, the political-economic
perspective questions reductionism by addressing dierent contexts of space and time,
and postmodern approaches are famous for including normative arguments. Last but
not least, scholars who argue that the state is the most important actor in political
geography are reductionist since they reduce other complexities to the nation-state.
Another attempt to structure the discipline is the one by Mamadouh (1998). She
categorised the dierent meanings of the term ‘geopolitics’ in view of two dimensions:
rstly, to which extent approaches are practical and applied versus academic and
reective; secondly, to which extent state-centrism is supported or neglected. The
categorisation yields four major approaches recognised as ‘geopolitics:’ neo-classical
geopolitics, subversive geopolitics, non-geopolitics, and post-structuralistic geopolitics
(cf. the division into ‘geopolitics’ and ‘anti-geopolitics’ by Drulák 2006). In other words,
she categorised the dierent meanings according to their ontological stance (state or
not state), and according to their epistemological stance (practical or theoretical). Again,
the connection to philosophy is inherent.
Concluding, the aforementioned philosophical debates are also pursued in political
geography. And as demanded by Mamadouh (2003, in the quotation above), scholars
of political geography try to clarify their key concepts continuously. In light of the
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ontological richness and the diversity of approaches within the discipline, it stands
to reason that the range of concepts is excessive, and that they are conceptualised in
divergent ways. The collection of Gallaher et al. (2009) outlines a total of twenty-eight
key concepts. Within the scope of the thesis we will mainly deal with three of them:
the nation-state, power, and scale. At this stage it is important to understand that the
diculties of the social science are omnipresent in political geography, and geographers
struggle to nd ontological and epistemological answers for the complexity of the object
they study.
Since political geography and international relations are interconnected (Criekemans
2009; Mamadouh and Dijkink 2006, 352-4), it is no wonder that similar philosophical
debates have been perpetuating in the latter too. But as a sub-discipline of political
science, international relations has been dominated by positivism (Mihic, Engelmann
and Wingrove 2005, 493; see also Shapiro 2002). Throughout last century, the supremacy
of positivism has been challenged by other approaches, which has made the discipline
infamous for its meta-theoretical debates. On the one hand, Walt (1998) and Lake (2013)
appreciated the so-called ‘great debates of international relations’ because they resulted
in a methodological tool set, and let the practitioner decide which tool is the best to use
for a particular situation.
On the other hand, instead of applying the tools, scholars believed they could
strengthen their approaches and argue for their superiority with the help of philosoph-
ical foundations. A lot of (yet) unsettled discussions resulted. Because of this, Monteiro
and Ruby (2009) speak of a ‘false promise of philosophical foundations.’ To them the
crux is that philosophical foundations are a priori knowledge, and ‘cannot be proven
true or false’ (32). So, if scholars use them to claim the scientic superiority of their
approaches, we will witness endless and unsolvable debates.
But philosophical foundations are not destined to cause these dilemmas. As long
as they are not used to argue for the pre-eminence of a particular approach, they
can strengthen and enhance the standpoints we develop. This is mainly because the
philosophy of science and the social sciences go hand in hand. The former can help the
latter to maintain their stance as ‘sciences,’ as we discussed in the previous sections.
(In fact, this thesis is a very attempt to do so for both phronetic social science and the
French school of géopolitiques.)
In light of this Monteiro and Ruby (2009) argue for a standpoint that is ‘post-
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foundational,’ or eclectic as Lake (2013) puts it. This means to engage with philosophical
foundations productively and to remain sceptic about discovering a single foundation
for the discipline in question. As we witnessed in international relations, philosophical
foundations are not intended to serve as leverage; rather they shall serve as guides to
strengthen and enhance established approaches. And, of course, they can also light the
path toward new ideas.
To conclude, the eld of international relations epitomises that the diculties of
social inquiry can have negative side eects for the discourse about a particular discipline
itself. What we must learn is that research in the social sciences is not only dicult in
practice. In addition, the complexity of social inquiry can motivate scholars to spend
their time and eort on work that lacks any relevant output but spurs inconclusive
discussions about the eld itself. Thus, research in the social eld is not only dicult
in theory but meta-theory. ‘Relevance’ is a keyword in this context. How must social
inquiry look like to be relevant? And what is it that makes social research relevant?
Since it is not our intention to ood political geography with inconclusive discussions,
we will discuss requirements for practising relevant social science in the next section.
1.4 What a contemporary approach must address
Let us epitomise the arguments of the previous sections. Social inquiry is a complex
endeavour whose scientic character is challenged. We saw that, depending on the
ontological and epistemological standpoint, scholars pursue research dierently. In
general, scholars contemplate about three conceptions: naturalism, reductionism, and
normativity. Naturalism and reductionism are dicult to hold because the object under
study is special in the social sciences. Moreover, it is impossible to pursue any research
value-free; thus, normativity becomes a side eect.
The elusiveness of the geographico-political environment is an obstacle to demarcate
disciplinary boundaries. Scholars were left without choice but to nd their specic
access to geographical-political questions. Thus, scholars think of and discuss their
eld diversely. While we witnessed the ingenuity of scholars who could enhance
their epistemological tool sets through philosophy, we discussed the negative eects
that philosophical foundations can have on discourse. We learned that, to avoid the
negative eects, we must pursue foundational prudence, be eclectic in the choice of the
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approach, and develop a standpoint that is post-foundational. Moreover, we may not
loose ourselves in meta-theoretical wars and keep track of the substantive world.
These aspects raise several dilemmas for geographico-political disciplines of which
I consider the following the most important: To engage in the elusiveness of the eld,
we require a diversied tool set but there is great danger to drift toward ‘anything
goes approaches.’ This tension forces us to work at two fronts: First, we must develop
an ontological perception that incorporates all kinds of geographico-political entities.
Second, we must prepare epistemological and methodological guidelines that enable
us to better understand these entities, and ensure both methodical rigour and socially
relevant results.
To conclude, we saw that questions of the philosophy of science become visible in
political geography by both metaphysical and epistemological uncertainty. Disciplines
that engage in geographico-political phenomena are broad (to say the least) which is
reected in the numerous sub-disciplines that incite a variety of dierent ontological
and epistemological standpoints. In turn, these standpoints are echoed in a diversied
tool set for engaging with geographico-political phenomena. From neorealists to critical
geopoliticians, scholars are keen to provide their answers in regard to what to investigate
in political geography and how to investigate it. Here, the greatest dilemma is to nd
balance between a suitable ontological standpoint that can incorporate the elusiveness
of the object under study, and epistemological and methodological guidelines that
prevent ‘anything goes approaches’ but provide an adequate way to deal with the
entities in question and produce relevant outcomes.
Hence, in the thesis we will propose an alternative solution to the prevalent tradi-
tions. In the following chapter, we will start by developing an ontological foundation
that provides insightful answers to the issues mentioned above.
Chapter 2
Reconsidering the core of critical realism
Let us take a closer look on how to solve the diculties of social inquiry with the
help of critical realism. What is today known as ‘critical realism’ is the conjunction
of ‘transcendental realism’ and ‘critical naturalism.’ Both were introduced by Bhaskar
([1979] 1998, 2008) who acknowledged the umbrella term ‘critical realism’ ex post. In this
chapter we ignore Bhaskar’s more recent contributions because these are infamously
subsumed under a ‘spiritual turn’ that lacks philosophical rigour (Benton and Craib
2011, 203). Moreover, Mäki and Oinas (2004) argues that geographers must reconsider
the core tenets of the philosophy.
The chapter is divided into four sections. In the rst section, we discuss the two most
important aspects of the philosophy: abandoning an anthropocentric worldview and
the pursuit of transcendental arguments. In the sections two and three, we reconsider
transcendental realism and critical naturalism respectively. The fourth section concludes
the chapter by outlining how critical realism is misunderstood in both international
relations and political geography.
2.1 The peculiarity of critical realism
While reading Bhaskar’s texts, the reader notices two reoccurring aspects. First, the
idea that the world can exist without science while science cannot exist without the
world; second, the pursuit of so-called ‘transcendental arguments.’ Let us rst take a
look on the rst aspect, and subsequently investigate the second one.
As Bhaskar (1998a, 35) criticises, the philosophy of science has tended to be too
anthropocentric. When we talked about naturalism, reductionism, and normativity,
sciences themselves have never been questioned, and philosophers and scientists have
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implicitly insisted on the existence of science. Not only have we taken for granted the
existence of science, we have also taken for granted the existence of humans and their
thinking.
But we can imagine a world without us and without our scientic endeavours
(Bhaskar 1998a, 35-6). The Earth, numerous other planets and the universe as a whole
will continue to exist if the entire human species is extinct. Likewise, the world will
continue to exist if there is no longer any scientic inquiry. They will not only cease if
humans are extinct, but a world where humans live but where there is no science is
imaginable (for example as was the case during the Stone Age). Hence, the world is
possible without humans; and the world is possible without science.
Yet, science is impossible without the world. What would science be about? Where
would science happen? Science investigates the world. If there is no world, there is no
science; it cannot do its job, its purpose is vanished, and it simply could not exist at all.
Because of this, the world must be a certain way and science becomes a spontaneous
aspect of it. We cannot take the existence of science for granted. Bhaskar (1998a, 22)
writes:
It is not necessary that science occurs. But given that it does, it is necessary that the world
is a certain way.
Now, let us turn to the second fundamental notion of Bhaskar’s elaborations: tran-
scendental arguments. They are spurred by questions that have the form ‘what must be
true in order for x to be possible?’ (Collier 1994, 20)
Although, the arguments root in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, according to
Collier (1994, 21-5), Bhaskar and Kant disagree in three aspects. First and foremost,
while Kant ponders knowledge in general, Bhaskar studies science which he considers a
special form of knowledge. Second, Kant is concerned about the mind, and demonstrates
how the mind inicts our knowledge on the world. On the contrary, the novel aspect
of the philosophy of Bhaskar is that it not only tells us something about the mind, it
further explains conditions of the world, separately from our mind.
Finally and third, Kant considers his philosophy to disclose some underlying truths
that are independent from both the historical context, and the mind thinking them.
But Bhaskar claims that there is no ultimate theory, neither in science nor in philo-
sophy. Thus, Bhaskar’s transcendental questioning implies that future transcendental
arguments can explain the world or our mind better than current ones do.
To summarise, two aspects of Bhaskar’s thinking are essential. First, a world without
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science is possible, but science without a world is impossible. Because of this, the world
must be a certain way. Second, Bhaskar adapts transcendental arguments to include
conclusions about both our mind and the world.
2.2 Transcendental realism: vindicating a distinct philosophical
ontology
According to Bhaskar (1998a), knowledge has two sides since it is concerned with two
types of objects. On the one hand we possess knowledge of so-called ‘intransitive
objects of knowledge,’ such as the speed of light; and on the other hand we possess
knowledge about so-called ‘transitive objects of knowledge,’ such as theories, models,
et cetera (16). The naming stems from the fact that intransitive objects of knowledge
are not subject to change, while the transitive objects of knowledge change. In other
words: the things we think of prevail while what we think about them changes.
Let us focus on the relationship between science and transitive objects of knowledge.
As discussed in the previous section, we can imagine a world without science. Because
transitive objects of knowledge are produced by science, it follows that we can imagine
a world without transitive objects of knowledge. If there is no science, a fact that we
claim to be possible, transitive objects of knowledge cease to exist too. Nevertheless,
there is a dependence the other way around: We cannot imagine science without
transitive objects of knowledge, because we need knowledge to produce knowledge.
‘Knowledge,’ as Bhaskar (1998a, 17) writes ‘depends upon knowledge-like antecedents.’
As Collier (1994, 51) argues, through the work of science, we continuously ‘transform’
transitive objects of our knowledge (about theories, models, et cetera) for deepening
our knowledge of intransitive objects.
Now, let us focus on the relation of science and intransitive objects of knowledge.
In the previous section we already concluded that we cannot imagine science without
the world. By means of our new wording, this implies that we cannot imagine science
without intransitive objects of knowledge. Transitive objects of knowledge depend on
both themselves and intransitive objects of knowledge. New knowledge is ‘a socially
produced knowledge of a natural (man-independent) thing’ (Bhaskar 1998c, 65).
Hence, we see that science is dependent on both intransitive and transitive objects
of knowledge whereas intransitive objects of knowledge are independent from both
science and its transitive objects of knowledge. This has two important implications.
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First, it makes intransitive objects of knowledge ontologically distinct from transitive
ones; second, it makes the mere existence of science an accident. Since science is not
a necessarily symptom of the world, it emerged spontaneously. Thus, it is legitimate
to ask the following two transcendental questions: ‘What must the world be like for
science to be possible?’ And: ‘What must science be like to give us knowledge of
intransitive objects (of this kind)?’ (Bhaskar 1998a, 18)
To answer the rst question, Bhaskar descends deeper and deeper into ontology,
from the experiences we make in scientic experiments, to events that we cannot
observe, and to the causal laws that we discover by means of science. Following this,
he respectively delineates three domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real.
The domain of the empirical includes the experiences we make when we experiment.
Since science is a spontaneous symptom of the world, there must exist an ontological
domain where structures are independent from whether we perceive them or not.
Bhaskar calls this domain the actual because there structures are actualised. It includes
both the experience we make when we experiment and the events that happen without
us experiencing them (in other words, the events that we observe and those that we do
not observe).
In the actual, events are triggered continuously. Thus, we can say that what triggers
them is the ‘causal agent of the sequence of events’ (25). On the contrary to positivst
views, it is not the causal agent of the causal law. Through experimenting we are able
to trigger the sequence of events but not the causal law itself.
The causal law and the sequence of events are not the same because for the sequence
of events to be triggered (at any time) there must be ‘something’ that is ontologically
distinct and can actualise in the actual. It must be ontologically distinct from both the
events and the experience. Thus, we need to conceptualise an additional domain called
the real. This domain includes causal laws, events, and experiences.
Following this, when we experience a constant conjunction of events, this does
not need to be a causal law per se. This is since causal laws are independent from
both events and experiences, and events are independent from experiences. In such
a situation, Bhaskar (1998a, 27) speaks of causal laws being ‘out of phase’ with both
patterns of events and experiences. This is the situation of an open system. In a
working experiment though, causal laws, constant conjunctions, and experiences are in
an one-to-one relationship and describe a closed system.
In light of the three domains, Bhaskar (1998a, 19) can demarcate his philosophy from
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prevalent philosophical traditions: classical empiricism and transcendental idealism. In
the case of classical empiricism, ‘science becomes a kind of epiphenomenon of nature’
(19); thus it reacts to what it perceives. In the case of transcendental idealism, the natural
world is constructed by the mind; thus science imposes what it thinks of the world
on the world. Hence, both philosophies are victims of the same mistake that Bhaskar
(1998a, 27) terms ‘epistemic fallacy.’
Prevalent philosophies deny the existence of a philosophical ontology that is distinct
from scientic ontologies and conate epistemology with ontology. While answering
epistemological questions, they also give ontological answers
[. . .] whereas transcendental realism asks explicitly what the world must be like for science
to be possible, classical philosophy asked merely what science would have to be like for
the knowledge it yielded to be justied. (32)
These new insights let us re-conceptualise causal laws as ‘generative mechanisms.’
According to Bhaskar (1998a, 36) these mechanisms
endure even when inactive and act even where, as in open systems, there is no one-to-one
relationship between the causal law representing the characteristic mode of operation of
the mechanism and the particular sequence of events that occurs.
Moreover we can re-conceptualise causal powers as ‘tendencies.’ Since there is
some-thing that acts, we can say this thing is a causal agent, and it possesses some kind
of causal power. However, because generative mechanisms endure outside of closed
systems too, we cannot say that they possess causal powers. ‘[P]owers are potentialities
which may or may not be exercised.’ (37) Powers can vanish. So, it is more useful to
speak of generative mechanisms holding ‘tendencies’ since tendencies may be exercised
but they also may endure ‘without being realized or manifest in any particular outcome’
(37).
Concluding, in transcendental realism, the world consists of three domains: the
real, the actual, and the empirical. The real is everything that exists, independent from
whether it is natural or social, or whether we know it or are unaware of it. In the
real, things have tendencies to interact with each other in a particular way. The most
important aspect to note here is that tendencies, even when hidden, exist and structures
in the real do possess them. The actual focuses on triggered tendencies, that is, the
actual events. But the underlying mechanisms, which are part of the real, are not part
of the actual. The empirical is what we perceive, excluding both the actual events and
the underlying mechanisms, but incorporates our perceptions of them.
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* * *
Now we know what the world must be like for science to be possible. But for science to be
the way it is, not only must we dierentiate between intransitive and transitive objects
of knowledge and our world’s three domains (real, actual, and empirical), we must also
think of the world as stratied, that is, characterised by multiple strata (Bhaskar 1998c,
67).
In academia we explain one stratum after the other. We witness that scholars use
what they discovered as new base for new discoveries. In turn, these discoveries will
serve as base for even newer discoveries. Thus Collier (1994, 109-10) dierentiates
between two dierent types of explanation: vertical explanation and horizontal explan-
ation. When we pursue vertical explanation, we explain one mechanism of one stratum
by means of another mechanism on another stratum. When we pursue horizontal
explanation, we explain an event by means of a mechanism and a stimulus on the same
stratum.
An example is the endeavour to understand smaller and smaller objects (Bhaskar
1998c, 66-7). For a while scientists have been persuaded that atoms are the smallest
objects of the world, until they discovered even smaller components: quarks. Thus they
transformed their already existing transitive objects of knowledge into new ones by
moving from one stratum to another, pursuing vertical explanation. On each of these
strata they developed models that describe the characteristics of the related entities.
Stratication does not imply a reductionist standpoint though. It does not necessarily
relate to endeavours that focus on understanding smaller and smaller objects. Another
example for stratication is how we conceptualise light. The behaviour of light can be
conceptualised in form of waves and in form of particles. These conceptualisations are
mutually independent.
Science seems to be stratied, so for it to be possible, the world is stratied too.
Hence, the world consists of dierent types of underlying mechanisms. By disclosing
them ‘we can see how knowledge of newly discovered strata,’ as Bhaskar (1998c, 67)
puts it, ‘may correct knowledge of less fundamental strata.’
By accepting that our world is stratied, we can explain why there is scientic
development. Once we acquired knowledge on one stratum, we move on to the next, and
science develops further on. Even if, at some point, we are convinced that we acquired
‘ultimate’ knowledge of one stratum, we can never be sure that the mechanisms we
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discovered are independent from underlying mechanisms of another stratum; so even
if there is a level that is ‘ultimate’ we would not know (68, 72).
It can also be shown that we cannot reduce one stratum to another. The tendency
that a thing possesses on one stratum persists even if we have disclosed it. Thus
endeavours that investigate dierent strata are equally important. Bhaskar (1998c, 72)
epitomises this with an enlightening example: ‘Dogs do not lose their power to bark
when we understand how they do so, just as glass does not cease to be brittle when we
know its molecular structure.’ Every stratum has its necessity because the tendencies,
which we try to disclose, continue to act in the real on every stratum.
Dierent strata of the world are represented by dierent disciplines (and their sub-
disciplines). They are inquiries that strive for the same real thing just by dierent means.
Physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, geography et cetera, each addresses
particular types of mechanisms.
Dierent types of mechanisms are related in terms of emergence, and sometimes
also in terms of composition Collier (1994, 107-34). Let us rst consider emergence.
Transcendental realism claims that strata are irreducible, that is, a ‘lower’ stratum
(physics) cannot supersede a ‘higher’ stratum (sociology). Rather, higher strata emerge
from lower strata. Things from lower strata (chemical substances) are governed by
mechanisms of the lowest strata, while things from higher strata (humans) are gov-
erned by mechanisms of both the lowest and higher strata. Stratication has neither a
beginning nor an end: on the one hand, we can dig deeper and deeper into ontology,
and, on the other hand, higher things, such as humans, form social groups, institutions,
nations, et cetera which all emerge from one another (116, 137-168) and all are subject
to investigation.
Since the tendency of things prevails on a stratum in question even if we understood
it, we cannot reduce a higher-level mechanism to a lower-level mechanism as proclaimed
by ontological and epistemological reductionists. Setting strata in relation to each other
is only possible through vertical explanation, that is, explaining one mechanism of one
stratum by means of another mechanism on another stratum. Obviously, to do so we
must have knowledge of one stratum rst. In science we witness that rst we must
have knowledge of ‘higher’ strata to explain ‘lower’ strata. How would we explain
pain on the stratum of physics, if we had not understood it on the strata of biology and
psychology? (113-4) If we did not know what ‘pain’ is, we would not know what to
look for.
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Since we now understood the implications of emergence, let us turn to composition.
We said, sometimes strata are also in relation of composition. Things of an emergent
stratum (for example humans) are composed of things of the stratum they are rooted in
(for example chemical substances). Because of this, things of higher strata are governed
by multiple mechanisms of dierent types.
The applicability of relations of both emergence and composition ‘allows for the
coexistence of holistic and analytical approaches’ (Collier 1994, 188). Each type of
inquiry attempts to understand dierent kinds of underlying mechanisms on dierent
strata while both of them are relevant.
Concluding, the idea that there exists a philosophical ontology distinct from scientic
ontologies implies that speaking of ‘things’ or ‘underlying mechanisms’ refers to entities
that we can neither perceive nor imagine. We must separate our scientic ontologies,
for example the idea that physics is concerned with ‘everything physical’ (whatever
that be), or that sociology is concerned with ‘everything social’ (whatever that be), from
our philosophical ontology. Collier (1994, 25) writes that ‘philosophy’s manner of work
is pure reason, but its raw materials are not.’
Philosophy can tell us what the world in its most abstract sense as we cannot even
imagine must look like for science to be possible to act upon its strata. This work, then,
manifests in particular scientic ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies. In this
context, the empirical is what we perceive; the actual is the rst underlying ‘layer’ that
incorporates the events that we perceive and, despite this, any other event that we do
not perceive; while the last ‘layer,’ the real, incorporates all of the aforementioned plus
the underlying mechanisms, which are neither directly perceivable nor imaginable at
all. The real manifests through the actual and the empirical only indirectly.
The previous paragraphs have already implied the consequences of transcendental
realism for social sciences in an introductory manner. In the next section we discuss
the implications for the social sciences in more detail. We do so by turning to the next
important step in critical realism’s development: critical naturalism.
2.3 Critical naturalism: an opportunity for the social sciences
Critical naturalism is the application of transcendental realism for the social sciences. It
is the answer to the question: ‘If we accept transcendental realism, how must the object
under study in the social sciences look like to make social inquiry possible?’ As will
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become clearer below, in this context critical naturalism ghts at two fronts: against
reductive naturalism, and against social constructivism.
This ght is visible in the essence of the two words that construct the term itself.
On the one hand, ‘critical naturalism’ applies some sort of naturalism since it accepts
that we can pursue science in the social realm objectively. The fact that intransitive
objects of knowledge exist independently from us goes against the perception of social
constructivists who claim that knowledge is created subjectively and compels the world
to be in a particular way. On the other hand, ‘critical naturalism’ asserts that inquiries in
the social realm cannot be reduced to intransitive objects of knowledge, which objects
to naturalism. In addition it says that it is impossible to detach social entities from
meaning.
Bhaskar (1998b) constructs critical naturalism in four steps: First, he introduces
a ‘transformational model of social activity;’ second, he argues that social forms are
real objects; third, he advocates that social science is possible because societies have
emergent features; and nally, he objects toward what is known as the ‘fact/value
dichotomy.’ His argument goes that social science will become emancipatory, if it
discloses prevalent relations within society (207).
To illustrate the argument for the existence of social forms, the concept of magnetic
elds, which is widely accepted in the natural sciences, is used as an allegory. On the
contrary to social forms, we do not question the existence of magnetic elds although
we cannot directly perceive them too. So why are social forms widely questioned and
magnet elds widely accepted? As it is the case with magnetic elds, it is the eects of
social forms that are visible.
To vindicate social forms, Bhaskar (1998b, 212-6) summarises existent models that
relate ‘society’ and ‘person.’ He then objects to all of them and presents his own con-
ception. There exist three models: the Weberian stereotype ‘Voluntarism’ (individuals
create society), the Durkheimian stereotype ‘Reication’ (society forms individuals), and
a ‘Dialectical’ conception of both (individuals create society, society forms individuals,
individuals create society, and so forth). These models are schemed in Figures 2.1, 2.2,
2.3, and 2.4.
All of these models fail to account for the relations between individuals or dif-
ferent social forms (nations, groups, et cetera). The third model even incorporates
the problems of the rst and second model: voluntaristic idealism and mechanistic
determinism respectively (214). The main problem I see is the following: Each model
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Figure 2.1: Weberian stereotype (Bhaskar 1998b, 212)
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Figure 2.4: Transformational model of the society/person connection (Bhaskar
1998b, 217)
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takes some account of ‘time’ as premiss. First there is either society or the individual,
and subsequently there is the second. In the dialectical model, this process repeats
continuously. Thus, at some point we would arrive at the question: ‘What was rst:
society or individual?’ which is misleading because in light of the questions, all of the
models debilitate.
Since none of these models can account for the society/individuals relation, Bhaskar
(1998b, 217) proposes what he calls a ‘transformational model of the society/person
connection.’ The model and his ideas on positions, practices, and relations that we will
discuss below, are referred to as ‘transformational model of social activity.’
In the text in question, he fails to connect the model to transcendental realism
explicitly, so let us discuss the following: In light of the previous section, individuals
and people are entities of dierent strata. These entities, to recall Collier, can be in
relation of both composition and emergence. Bhaskar (1998b, 215) concludes:
Society is both the ever-present condition (material cause) and the continually reproduced
outcome of human agency. And [social] praxis is both work, that is conscious production,
and (normally unconscious) reproduction of the conditions of production, that is society.
Thus, society and individuals possess certain causal powers and inuence each
other. They are ever-present, that is, they can only exist in relation to each other, while
none creates the other. Rather, individuals transform and reproduce society; and society
socialises individuals. They are ontologically distinct but stand in relation.
Let us consider some deciencies of Bhaskar’s argument for the sake of clarication.
The arguments above derive from transcendental realism, a philosophical ontology.
However, the elaborations of Bhaskar do include non-philosophical accounts. He moved
from a philosophical argument to an argument he ghts within the social sciences. So,
we must be careful not to intermingle his wording with the one by transcendental
realism. The crux of the matter becomes visible in the following formulation (219,
emphasis by me):
Society [. . .] is an articulated ensemble of tendencies and powers which, unlike natural
ones, exist only as long as they (or at least some of them) are being exercised; are exercised
in the last instance via the intentional activity of human beings; and are not necessarily
space-time invariant.
In the emphasis above, Bhaskar dierentiates between social and natural entities,
which I think is dangerous because it may raise what it actually tries to object to: the
account of a fundamental dierence between the natural and the social sciences.
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His wording is imprecise and must be formulated more clearly: In regard to scientic
ontology, natural and social objects are dierent; but in regard of philosophical ontology,
natural and social objects are the same. Thus, accounts of transcendental realism still
apply. The dierence lies only in terms of the strata that the natural and social sciences
address. Social objects of knowledge emerge on higher strata than natural objects of
knowledge while being composed of intransitive objects of knowledge of lower strata
(remember Collier’s argument concerning dierent relations between strata: emergence
and composition). From the ontological perspective of scientists (not philosophers),
these dierences manifest in distinct scientic ontologies.
Hence, ‘human sciences [. . .] take intransitive objects like any other’ while, as
Bhaskar (1998b, 227) puts it, ‘the categorial properties of such objects dier.’ These
diering characteristics impose certain scientically ‘ontological limits on the possibility
of naturalism’ (224, 218). In other words, in science (not philosophy) we witness dierent
ontological features of social structures (218-9):
1. Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the activ-
ities they govern.
2. Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the agents’
conceptions of what they are doing in their activity.
3. Social structures, unlike natural structures, may be only relatively enduring (so
that the tendencies they ground may not be universal in the sense of space-time
invariant).
As we have mentioned, other models lack an account of the relations within and
between social structures. On the contrary, the three points above include such a
relational conception. First, social structures are inherently connected to the actions
they pursue; second, social structures are internally related to their own perception of
their activities; and third, social structures are related in such a way that they cannot
exist without what they are related to. As for example visible in the transformational
model of the society/person connection, individuals and society will cease to exist, if
one of them ceases to exist.
Nevertheless, the fact that social structures are ontological distinct and related to
each other simultaneously makes progress and history possible (217). In this context,
the function of people is twofold. By making social products, they make the conditions
of their making. Thus, we need social-scientic and not natural-scientic explanations
when we deal with higher strata. Obviously, natural objects impose certain constrains
on social objects, because they are in relation of composition, but it is the relation of
emergence that makes social science possible and necessary. Emergence creates distinct
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intransitive objects that come with their own tendencies and are called ‘social.’
Epitomising these ideas, it is positions, practices, and relations that are the most
important in the social sciences (221). Practices are signicant because people make
social products and the conditions of their making. Positions are signicant because
they, on the contrary to individuals, imply that it is the relation of an individual to
others that is important. In regard to relations, additionally interesting are natural
surroundings because they impose constrains, and interpersonal relations because they
aect positions.
Concluding, there are two diculties in social inquiry which hinder the pursuit of
classical philosophies. First, we cannot set up experiments to test our theories because
on the strata of social structures the system is too open; second, society is inherently
connected to the eects that we want to investigate because they are, while ontologically
distinct, related (225).
Since classical philosophies cannot address open systems, they can oer neither
scientic critique nor human self-emancipation (227). On the contrary, critical realism
can oer these in due consideration of transcendental arguments.
Bhaskar (1998b, 220-30) proposes to use transcendental arguments in the social
sciences. Again, he lacks some clarity on how to do so, so let us think of how to initiate
a transcendental argument within the social sciences. As said, positions, practices,
and relations are crucial. Hence, a question for departure can be the following: ‘What
must the positions, practices, and relations be like for the issue under investigation
to be possible?’ We see, in virtue of scientic transcendental arguments, the social
sciences get an explanatory turn. As we did in the philosophical elaborations, pursuing
a transcendental argument helps us to circumvent epistemological problems (see also
Collier 1994, 166-7).
Scientic transcendental arguments open the door for critique because
such a transcendental analysis in social science, in showing (when it does) the historical
conditions under which a certain set of categories may be validly applied, ipso facto shows
the conditions under which they may not be applied. (Bhaskar 1998b, 231)
Now the argumentation got a turn that requires us to address what is known as the
‘fact/value dichotomy.’ Let us rst consider the traditional standpoint, and then discuss
the arguments of critical naturalists.
Especially the positivist school claims that (a) facts may not be concerned with
values, and (b) values may not interfere with facts. Thus, science may not tell us what
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to do, which opposes to the quotation above. The argument goes that sciences must be
value-free because sciences are only concerned with facts. (We discussed these notions
in the previous chapter.) However, as we showed, science is a social product which
makes value-freeness within every science impossible. And especially in the social
sciences, it is often values that are under investigation. So, instead of dropping them
from our inquiries, we need to strive for ‘maximum explanatory power’ (Bhaskar 1998b,
238) to understand values as best as we can.
This raises the question: How can our investigations achieve maximum explanatory
power? By disclosing false believes which, in turn, are responsible for misguided actions.
For every discourse to be fruitful we must commit to truth, consistency, coherence,
rationality, et cetera because ‘they are a condition of the possibility of discourse in
general.’ (242) Since believes are social products, they are roots for our actions, and thus
become inherently decisive. If they are false, they will misguide both discourse and
action. Because of this it is not only sucient to articulate that a certain belief is false,
further any critic must state how one could come to such a belief, that is, explaining the
belief itself (242). To explain the believe, we must disclose pertaining positions, actions,
and relations associated with the issue in question.
By doing so, we transform social practices, society, and initiate change. While
we explain, we acquire the transitive dimension of objects. Our knowledge is subject
to permanent change because we remain uncertain about its correctness. We debate,
discuss, and criticise what we elaborated, and try to improve our knowledge. Being
critical naturalists and explaining the social world, we pursue ‘explanatory critique’
(Collier 1994, 170-90; also Sayer 2000, 158-71). By producing explanations about the
social world, we disclose false beliefs, and, in turn, criticise social forms (institutions,
organisations, et cetera) that perpetuate such beliefs. By criticising them, we indirectly
(or directly) demand social forms that preserve true beliefs instead, which becomes
visible through normative notions.
We proceeded the argument above under the premise that human agency is causal
(Bhaskar 1998b, 207). In other words, we presupposed that people possess responsibility
because they are capable of initiating change. A critic might raise the concern that
individuals lack power to do so because they are determined by external conditions.
However, transcendental realism implies what Collier (1994, 118) calls ‘stratied
freedom.’ We saw that our world is stratied, and dierent strata can be in relation of
emergence and composition; thus, they are irreducible to each other. As a consequence,
2.3. Critical naturalism: an opportunity for the social sciences 35
the actions of intransitive objects of knowledge are irreducible too. One of the emergent
powers (manifested in certain tendencies) that people share is ‘the power to act on
the ground of reasons.’ (118) Indeed, as objects of higher strata, we possess powers
of multiple strata since we are composed of and emerge from intransitive objects
of a variety of lower strata (120). This gives us both certain freedom and certain
responsibility, thus agency.
Now, let us conclude and summarise the aforementioned aspects through the per-
spective of Collier (1994) which will contribute further clarication. First and foremost,
we cannot explain our world through conditions but a multiplicity of causes (125-6).
This is because a conception of progress through conditions that are followed by causes
presupposes our world to stand still concerning some aspects but to be mobile in others.
But the real consists of tendencies – not conditions – that have eects on each other
permanently and manifest in the actual through events that we perceive sometimes.
Second, reasons, that is, our believes and desires, must be analysed as tendencies too,
because sometimes they are exercised, sometimes they are not; in any event, an ex-
planation is possible by investigating the deeper structures of reasons (155). Third, the
social sciences are an explanatory science, a science without closure, and a science with
hermeneutic premisses (161).
The great dierence between the natural and social sciences is that, on the contrary
to natural scientists, social scientists cannot actualise the abstractions of the objects
under study (251). In the natural sciences, once there is some hypothesis about an issue
in question, academics can implement closure and test what they assume. But in the
social sciences experiments are impossible because they deal with strata that are far too
open (see also 121). Nonetheless, like the natural sciences can emancipate society from
nature, the social sciences can emancipate society from itself, that is, from prevalent
false believes of and about it. As we just saw, transcendental arguments that manifest
in explanatory critiques open us the door to an emancipatory social science.
Collier (1994, 198-9) summarises ve conditions for practices to be emancipatory:
1. Our reasons must have eects, that is, we must act according to our reasons.
2. We must subscribe to values and believes. Otherwise, there is no sense in norm-
ative discourse.
3. Any critique must happen within the society it criticises, and the critique must
be open to other critiques.
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4. Possibilities for change must be feasible and needed. If they are not feasible,
we cannot implement them. If they are not needed (by anybody), we will not
implement them. Without willingness, change is not possible.
5. We must accept the notion of emergent powers, and these must be knowable
to us. If we do not accept transcendental realism, we will maybe drift toward
naturalism and demand natural (not social) change. If the powers in questions
are not knowable to us, our explanation failed in the rst place.
This has already been a long journey, but what is still left is a short critique of Collier
(1994) and Sayer (2000). In my opinion, certain weaknesses of both texts hamper a
correct understanding of why Bhaskar’s ideas are logically consistent, and what they
are actually about – these are worth mentioning.
Collier (1994) can only provide – as the sub-title of the book says – ‘an introduc-
tion to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy’ in the sense that it positions the philosophy in a
broader philosophical context. It does so by preparing the reader with knowledge
about transcendental arguments, explaining their origin, and relating Kant’s account
of them to Bhaskar’s; by criticising particular passages written by Bhaskar for lack of
clarity; by providing references for further reading; by debunking some of Bhaskar’s
thoughts from philosophical terms; and eventually criticising critical naturalism for its
positive outlook on scientic social inquiries (all of these aspects became clear in the
previous passages). However, the departure of the thinking of Bhaskar, that is, what the
philosophy rests upon, is never made clear. The departure is the dierentiation between
intransitive and transitive objects of knowledge, and the spontaneity of science. Not
until page 31 the reader gets a glimpse of the spontaneity of science; not until page
50, the reader is introduced to the fact that objects of knowledge are twofold. But, as
we saw, these construct the base for Bhaskar’s entire argument. The reader cannot
understand why Bhaskar constructs transcendental realism, and must assume that it is
another philosophical postulate based on faith. But transcendental realism is dierent
because it provides a distinct philosophical ontology.
In the rst part of his book, Sayer introduces critical realism and its key features.
There, in a section on ‘Stratication and Emergence,’ he writes (Sayer 2000, 12):
In distinguishing the real, the actual and the empirical, critical realism proposes a “stratied
ontology” in contrast to other ontologies which have “at” ontologies populated by either
the actual or the empirical, or a conation of the two.
2.4. Misunderstandings in the geographico-political discourse 37
The formulation implies that our world is divided into three strata: real, actual, and
empirical. But Sayer misunderstands Bhaskar. The statement is wrong. It conates
two distinct features of transcendental realism: rst, the three domains; and second,
the concept of stratication. These are two dierent and distinct characteristics of our
world. For science to be possible, the world must consists of the three domains; plus,
for science to be possible the way it is, it must be stratied. It is a small but decisive
mistake.
These two examples demonstrate that both philosophers and social scientists fail
to give a full account of Bhaskar’s philosophy. In the following we will see how these
mistakes perpetuate in applications of critical realism for political geography and
international relations.
2.4 Misunderstandings in the geographico-political discourse
Let us investigate how critical realism is accommodated in international relations and
political geography.
Although scholars of international relations have a well-developed tradition of
contemplating about their discipline’s meta-theoretical side, they considered possible
consequences of critical realism only recently. In a forum by Millenium, dierent
academics discussed the importance of scientic realism and critical realism for in-
ternational relations theory. Nonetheless, the contributions by Joseph (2007), Kurki
(2007), and Wight (2007) as a whole provide a rather puzzling understanding of ‘critical
realism,’ ‘scientic realism,’ and ‘realism’ in general.
To a certain extent the scholars fail to distinguish between critical realism as a philo-
sophical ontology and any scientic ontology or epistemology that has been developed
in their eld. The fact that international relations is concerned about theories that
name themselves ‘realisms’ increases semantic diculties (classical realism, realism,
neorealism, defensive and oensive realism, to mention a view). In discourse about
them it is easy to slip from one meaning to another, in such a way that one remains
puzzled what is actually meant. This problem is addressed by Cherno (2007) who,
rst of all, tries to clarify the dierences between scientic and critical realism, and
eventually criticises the misinterpretations by the aforementioned scholars. At the end
he concludes that critical realism will not have a chance to gain further momentum
38 Chapter 2. Reconsidering the core of critical realism
in international relations because it lacks ‘epistemic, methodological, philosophical or
pragmatic benets’ (Cherno 2007, 407).
Brown (2007) foresees a much more positive future for critical realism in interna-
tional relations theory. He asserts the philosophy might even be able to agitate a fth
great debate. But, instead of looking forward to this possibility, he hopes that discourse
concerning an adaptation will not bear fruit because it could ‘revitalise debates over epi-
stemology and ontology.’ Similar to Monteiro and Ruby (2009), he is afraid of the impact
that philosophical foundations can have for scientic discourse – as we saw, scholars of
international relations know what they are talking about here. But if the inuence of
critical realism on debates within international relations encourages discourse about
novel adaptations of Marxism, he is ‘all for it’ (Brown 2007, 416).
From my point of view critical realism has a dicult stance in the discipline of
international relations because of the positivist (thus empiricist) bulwark that has been
developing in political science over the years in general, which we mentioned in the
previous chapter. The word ‘realism’ has been used completely dierent from its usage
in philosophy. And ‘theory’ (opposed for example to Bhaskar’s conception of it as simply
something abstract) has become a bloated terminus – busy with the meta-theoretical
discussions that have continuously perpetuated in the eld, scholars of international
relations neglected the rise of another ‘realism’ of completely dierent form. So, it is
no longer puzzling how the philosophical movement propelled by critical realism in
the 1970s and 1980s took decades to be considered a possible origin for new disputes
within international relations theory.
The situation in geography was completely dierent. According to Mäki and Oinas
(2004, 1771) geographers simply ‘grabbed’ what was available to them that objected to
the solely quantitative and positivist developments of their discipline during the same
period. Since this was exactly when Bhaskar and other philosophical realists published
their ideas, their contributions were welcomed. Geography encountered critical realism.
Nevertheless, similar to what we just mentioned concerning the forum in Millenium,
often the philosophy remains misunderstood as either an epistemology, a method or
yet another dogma (Yeung 1997). And if it is understood correctly, it is criticised for its
lack of methodological guidance. But, as Yeung (1997) points out correctly: First, critical
realism has never been intended to present a method (it is a philosophical ontology); and
second, each discipline is required to develop a suitable method on top of critical realism
by and of itself. (With the text at hand, we try to achieve this for geographico-political
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disciplines.)
Realism has always been present in geography. But since critical realism arrived, it
has helped geographers to pursue their research more ‘self-consciously’ (Sayer 2001,
2980-3): The philosophy helps to address the uniqueness of geographical phenomena;
it can account for research that addresses ‘spatial dierentiation and uneven develop-
ment.’ Because it was used for localities studies, geographers have raised fear about
their colleagues misunderstanding critical realism and privileging particular scales. Nev-
ertheless, the philosophy itself endorses research of multiple strata, and investigating a
phenomenon on more than one level through abstraction simultaneously.
In regard to international relations, we already hinted that positivism has had great
inuence on wording, which raises confusion about the meaning of particular terms.
Likewise, in regard to geography Pratt (2009, 379) adds that the dierent meanings
‘from (naive) realism (or empiricism) [. . .] to the strong version of (transcendental)
realism’ complicates comprehension. These diculties notwithstanding, critical realism
is appreciated in human geography, economic geography, urban and social geography,
as well as sociology (381-2). While guides for applied research based on critical real-
ism are welcomed, these contributions are also criticised because ‘realism risks being
stripped of its philosophical baggage and simply presented as the advocacy of “common
sense”’ (382). ‘Common sense’ because critical realism is open to a variety of research
approaches. The risk lies in the misinterpretation to read methodological pluralism as
support for any type of research to be possible.1
Certainly, critical realism has not only been welcomed in geography. C. Rose (1990)
summarises positive and negative reactions, and proposes ‘pragmatic realism’ to solve
the turbulences. This is not the place to criticise this new approach in detail (although
there is reason to do so),2 but let us outline the review about positive and negative
responses. Geographers see positively that critical realism can help to reconsider
‘reference, meaning and truth’ instead of addressing ‘objects, events and meaning’
solely (168). In addition, geographers appreciate that the philosophy helps to dispose of
1. I see such a tendency also visible in conceptualising so-called ‘intensive’ and ‘extensive’ research as
done by Sayer (2000, 21).
2. From my point of view, pragmatic realism (a) is an adapted version of transcendental idealism
hiding under ‘realism;’ (b) cannot compensate the failures that are raised toward critical realism in
C. Rose (1990); and (c) cannot give account to the advantages of critical realism that are mentioned at
the beginning of the article. Further, C. Rose (1990) question the privileged status of critical realism,
but critical realism is indeed somewhat original because it proposes, unlike classical empiricism and
transcendental idealism, a distinct philosophical ontology.
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an ‘outmoded’ (C. Rose 1990, 169) understanding of causality and accepts that, next to
physical causes, reasons can be causes too.
But other scholars of the eld blame critical realism to be too hypothetical because
the real will always remain hidden. They criticise that contingency plays a much too
prominent role in critical realism. Thus, they ask, ‘how does a realist have knowledge of
layers of reality which remain hidden to everyone else?’ (171) In light of the explanations
above, we can counter that transcendental realism, the philosophical ontology of critical
realism, should primarily be understood as an enhancement of scientic ontologies; and
it advocates that it is dicult but possible for science to generate outcome. Fallibility is
a restriction scientists have had to deal with since Popper conceptualised his concept of
empirical falsiability. That we may never now ‘the ultimate truth’ is a well-known
circumstance.
The reactions of geographers to critical realism are multifaceted. To mention two
examples: Roberts (2001) provides a Marxist critique of critical realism, claiming that
the philosophy, when applied, is too much internally related and cannot address the
historical context of what is investigated. Lawson and Staeheli (1990, 17) advocate the
usage of critical realism, not only because it considers place ‘integral to the structure of
social relations.’
Overall, a literature review shows that ‘realism’ is sometimes used to refer to
Bhaskar’s philosophy, sometimes to a naive common sense realism, and sometimes to
something in-between. This makes it dicult to demarcate which ‘realism’ scholars
actually address, and how they address transcendental realism in particular – whether
positively or negatively.
Because of the dierent meanings of ‘realism’ in geographic meta-discourse, Mäki
and Oinas (2004) dierentiate between ‘CoreRealism’ and ‘GeoRealism.’ The rst term
relates to the underlying philosophical proposition of realism as developed by Bhaskar
and others in the 1970s and 80s; the second term relates to the reading of the philosophy
by geographers, and the construct they created by shaping the philosophy according
to their needs throughout the recent decades. According to Mäki and Oinas (2004,
1763) GeoRealism cannot live up to CoreRealism because of ‘resource narrowness’
and ‘domain narrowness.’ GeoRealism ignores contemporary debates about realism in
philosophy, and impedes itself to particular research topics unnecessarily. This dilemma
developed without geographers noticing it, according to the authors.
Let us take a closer look on these bottlenecks. In regard to resource narrowness, geo-
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graphers are not necessarily forced to accept every new idea that has been contributed
by philosophers, but it might enlighten theoretical disputes in human geography (1761-
3). Mäki and Oinas (2004, 1763) claim that GeoRealism dropped notions of ontological,
semantic, and epistemological realism that have developed throughout recent decades.
In regard to domain narrowness, GeoRealism dissociates itself from social construct-
ivist accounts that are actually pro-realist because it considers them anti-realist. For
example, even postmodern academics such as Michel Foucault can be read as realists
(see Woodiwiss and Pearce 2005). But GeoRealism has imposed a particular metaphysics
of causation, society, and methodology of research on geographico-political disciplines
(Mäki and Oinas 2004, 1763).
Today, we are faced with a ‘a narrow monopolistic usage of “realism”’ which results
in a neglect of the philosophy in recent meta-theoretical debates of the discipline (Mäki
and Oinas 2004, 1772, 1774; see also Pratt 2009; Sayer 2001). As a consequence of
GeoRealism, CoreRealism has eventually become unalluring since the limitations of
the former have been foisted on the latter. Hence, the authors provide reasons for the
misunderstanding of realism as discussed above – no matter whether as epistemology,
method, or dogma. In this chapter we already emphasised that critical realism (tran-
scendental realism in particular) is a philosophical ontology, thus claried its original
purpose.
To conclude this chapter, we demonstrated that critical realists can object to positivists
by saying: ‘Our critical and emancipatory notions stem from the fact that the world
consists of multiple strata and our knowledge about it is fallible,’ and in the same breath
address the idealists appending: ‘However, there exists a world independent from us, and
objectivity can be sustained to a certain extent because of the existence of the real.’ We
encountered a philosophical foundation that ‘seeks to avoid both scientism and “science-
envy”’, as Sayer (2000, 3) puts it. Critical realism is a third way between naturalism,
empiricism, and positivism, on the one hand; and interpretivism, the critical school,
and postmodernism on the other hand (Sayer 2000, 2; also Collier 1994, 237). This is
achieved by dierentiating between two types of knowledge (transitive and intransitive);
conceptualising three domains (real, actual, and empirical); the stratication of both
the world and science whose strata are in relations of emergence and composition; the
transformational model of social activity that argues that society consciously produces
and reproduces itself by means of positions, practices, relations, and false believes; and
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the concept of stratied freedom that gives social forms both will and responsibility.
Thus, critical realism provides insightful solutions to the diculties of social inquiry.
In the next two chapters we will translate critical realism ‘into concrete [methodo-
logical] propositions,’ as requested by Harvey (2002, 164). This will be done by fusing
the core of critical realism with ‘phronetic social science’ that is developed by Bent
Flyvbjerg and the notion of ‘géopolitiques’ by Yves Lacoste. Let us start by outlining
phronetic social science in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Phronetic social science: real(ist) social science?
In the previous chapters we became familiar with the challenges that social sciences
face to maintain their stance as scientic inquiries. We encountered critical realism
as a solution and learned that challenges and answers by the philosophy are picked
up in geographico-political disciplines. Positive and negative responses come to the
conclusion that the philosophy lacks substantial advice. While the transformational
model of social activity provides ideas for conducting critical realism in the social
sciences, the previous chapter has shown that the model does not provide a full-edged
methodology. Moreover, we saw that geography, by distancing itself from realism’s
core arguments, has developed some sort of ‘GeoRealism’ that is criticised to be of no
avail philosophically and methodologically ambiguous in like manner.
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to make the rst step in identifying cornerstones for
a methodology based on critical realism that can be conducted in geographico-political
disciplines. The notions of an emancipatory research approach that became known as
‘phronetic social science’ will help us to do so. Building upon ideas by Aristotle and
Foucault, Flyvbjerg depleted science of theoretical arguments, and argued for praxis. He
developed three pillars that can help us to provide a novel critical realist methodology
for political geography. Certainly, successfully challenging prevailing traditions that
have endured for decades cannot be achieved thus easily. As we will see, phronetic
social science is criticised from dierent angles. The approach undermines theory at
large, and fails to incorporate an account of spatiality.
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3.1 Meeting Aristotle and Foucault
Fifteen years ago, Bent Flyvbjerg introduced ‘phronetic social science’ ([2001] 2011). By
fusing ideas of Aristotle that propose general principles for scientic inquiry and Michel
Foucault’s conceptualisation of ‘power,’ Flyvbjerg showed how social sciences can be
emancipatory and have practical impact. In his treatise Making Social Science Matter
argues that the social sciences are inherently dierent from the natural sciences, thus,
require distinct research approaches. According to Flyvbjerg, the social sciences require
research that ‘deconstruct[s] the conventional scientic ideal of the social sciences,
with its emphasis on theory and context-independence’ ([2001] 2011, 49). This claim is
based on the re-discovery of three terms that were coined by Aristotle (57):
Episteme Scientic knowledge. Universal, invariable, context-independent. Based on
general analytical rationality. The original concept is known today from the terms
‘epistemology’ and ‘epistemic’.
Techne Craft/art. Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented toward produc-
tion. Based on practical instrumental rationality governed by a conscious goal.
The original concept appears today in terms such as ‘technique’, ‘technical’, and
‘technology’.
Phronesis Ethics. Deliberation about values with reference to praxis. Pragmatic, variable,
context-dependent. Oriented toward action. Based on practical value-rationality.
The original concept has no analogous contemporary term.
According to Flyvbjerg, episteme and techne found their representation in today’s
philosophy of science whereas phronesis remains missing. Since their entirety is neces-
sary for successful scientic inquiry, the lack of phronesis questions the current modus
operandi of the social sciences.
Flyvbjerg combines these notions with insights on the concept of power as postulated
by Foucault (121-2): First, power relations are inherent and underlying in any type
of relations (from personal, economic, to diplomatic) while not necessarily limiting
but inuencing these. Second, power is not ordered toward a particular direction,
that is, ‘both the dominant and dominated enter into relations of power’ (121). Third,
power cannot be possessed, thus passed or gained since it is an exercised practice. And
fourth, power always comes with some sort of resistance, thus resistance is an indicator
for power relations. Because of these notions, the phronetic researcher must ask the
following questions in regard to power relations (123):
What are the most immediate and the most local power relations operating, and how do
they operate? How has the active exercise of power in the relations being investigated
aected the possibilities for the further exercise of power, with the resulting reinforcement
of certain power relations and the attenuation of others? How are power relations linked
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together, according to what logic and strategy? How have these relations made certain
rationalities possible and others impossible, and how do the rationalities support or oppose
the power relations? How can the games of power be played dierently?
These questions demonstrate that power and its implications are important for
phronetic investigations, and, as we will see later, they enable us to show that Flyvbjerg’s
ideas include realist notions.1
By combining Aristotle’s ideas on episteme, techne, and phronesis with Foucault’s
conceptualisation of power, Flyvbjerg attempts to develop an alternative approach that
challenges prevalent research conceptions in the social sciences. The entanglement
of Aristotle and Foucault calls for social inquiry that ‘eectively deals with public
deliberation and praxis, rather than being strangled with [. . .] vainly attempts to
emulate natural science’ (129). The social sciences are considered dierent from the
natural sciences per se.
Flyvbjerg’s eorts fell on fertile ground. Ten years later, Flyvbjerg, Landman and
Schram (2012c) were able to provide a collection that documents research that had been
pursued in virtue of phronesis. The contributions vary from analyses of mega projects,
media, and policy to research in inequality studies, political science, educational studies,
and geosurveillance. Further, the authors epitomise the theory behind phronetic social
science in an introductory part and contribute that ‘tension points’ (Flyvbjerg, Landman
and Schram 2012a) have emerged as linchpin for phronetics. In the meanwhile, the
approach succeeded in strengthening the Perestroika movement (see Flyvbjerg 2004a;
Laitin 2003; Monroe 2005; Schram and Caterino 2006) that aims at enhancing the
practicability of political science. Last but not least, the approach was also echoed in
the discipline of international relations (see for example Brown 2012).
3.2 Contextualising phronetic inquiry’s three pillars
Flybjerg’s research approach consists of three pillars: four key questions; nine method-
ological guidelines; and so-called ‘tension points.’ What follows is an overview of these
sixteen cornerstones as they have been provided in literature on phronetics. While
1. Not to go beyond the scope of the thesis, I refrain from further discussing the concept of power (see
for example Hayward 2000; Lukes 2004). Conceptualising power is dicult since ‘we are not likely to
produce – certainly not for some considerable amount of time to come – anything like a single, consistent,
coherent “Theory of Power.”’ (Dahl 1957)
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doing so, we will address each cornerstone shortly and set the path for a critical review
that follows in the next section.
The four key questions are (Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram 2012b, 5):
1. Where are we going with a specic problematic?
2. Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanism of power?
3. Is this development desirable?
4. What, if anything, should we do about it?
In this context, it is worth noting that the questions are inherently normative and
call for emancipating society. By answering the rst question, the phronetic researcher
delineates the context of the object under study. Concurrently, researchers try to predict
where development in society will lead us if the concern in question remains ignored.
The second question addresses power relations that prevail within this context. ‘Gaining’
and ‘loosing’ indicate that the researcher must develop a particular attitude toward what
is observed. To answer whether the development is desirable or not, requires phronetic
researchers to strengthen their attitude. By answering the fourth question, researchers
eventually articulate what society ought to do. Certainly, normativity comes with the
danger to spur unilateral perceptions. We discussed this in the previous chapters and
will put more focus on this aspect in regard to phronetic social science soon.
This normative momentum is also reected in the nine methodological guidelines
that Flyvbjerg develops. Discussing these will clarify the notions behind the key
questions. They are as follows (numbering corresponds to Flyvbjerg 2004b, 290-302; cf.
Flyvbjerg [2001] 2011, 130-40):
1. focus on values;
2. place power at the core of analysis;
3. get close to reality;
4. emphasise the ‘little things;’
5. look at practice before discourse;
6. study cases and contexts;
7. ask ‘how?’ doing narrative;
8. move beyond agency and structure;
9. and dialogue with a polyphony of voices.
An analysis of the guidelines reveals that they are redundant, so let us categorise
them. I delineate ‘ethics,’ ‘ontology,’ and ‘emancipation.’ In regard of ethics, Flybjerg
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oers the rst two guidelines that address power and values. Focusing on values,
according to Flyvbjerg, means pursuing contextualism rather than foundationalism or
relativism. The idea is to consider context-dependency, or as written: ‘situational ethics,’
which shall result in ‘an attitude [. . .] not based on idiosyncratic morality or personal
preferences, but on a common view among a specic reference group’ (Flyvbjerg 2004b,
291). Flyvbjerg suspects criticism about the ambiguity of ‘common view.’ Thus, he
further describes research context as ‘socially and historically conditioned’ and society
and history as ‘the only foundations we have, the only solid ground under our feet’
(291). It remains open where to ‘nd’ this ground, how to deal with it, and how it leads
to a particular way of inquiry.
The crucial role of power within phronetic research has already been outlined
above: power is meant to be put at the core of analysis. Since this calls for a phronetic
concept of power, Flyvbjerg (2004b, 293) provides it by ‘[c]ombining the best of a
Nietzschean/Foucauldian interpretation of power with the best of a Weberian/Dahlian
one’. Flyvbjerg ([2001] 2011, 293) adds, in virtue of Focault, that power is inherently
connected to knowledge, truth, and rationality; and he stresses that inquiries must
concentrate on how power is practised within structures while who and why it is
exercised is secondary. This, according to Flyvbjerg, will only be achieved if research
focuses on ‘specic practices.’ These notions are similar to Bhaskar’s demand to focus
on positions, practices, and relations.
In regard to ontology, Flyvbjerg expects to get as close to reality as possible; to
emphasise ‘little things;’ to study cases and contexts; and to go beyond agency and
structure. While these guidelines are not restrained to ontological aspects (they also
give epistemological and methodological advice), the essence of each guideline is of
ontological concern.
According to Flyvbjerg, getting close to reality means to generate research results
that have value for society. Is it possible for researchers to know what is ‘valuable’
and what is not? Flyvbjerg (2004b, 294) argues that the ‘focus on relations of values
of power [. . .] typically creates interest in the research by parties outside the research
community’ which can spur a dialogue between relevant parties, and thus creates value
for society. The ultimate outcome, then, is research that is located within the contexts
of the object under study. Obviously, this guideline brings us back to the dilemma about
value-neutrality that we already discussed, and also Flyvbjerg (2004b, 294) is aware of.
However, he claims that researchers can avoid the concerns about value judgements by
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critically self-reecting the own position throughout research. Thus, what is valuable
for society can be traced objectively, according to him.
Flyvbjerg (2004b, 295) calls for a ‘focus on minutiae’ by ‘searching for the Great
within the Small and vice versa’ to yield ‘work that is at the same time as detailed
and as general as possible.’ His guideline to study cases and contexts points toward
the same direction. In both guidelines, we can read his proclamation for case study
research as fortied in a later publication. By objecting to ve ‘misunderstandings of
case-study research,’ Flyvbjerg (2006) presents an ode to case studies (cf. Gerring 2007).
Flyvbjerg (2004b, 298) recommends to take into account what ‘will best help answer
the four phronetic questions at the core of the research.’ In both texts he argues for the
possibility to generalise from the particular.
Still concerned with ontology, the target of the eighth guideline is to move beyond
agency and structure. By stating that ‘it is a demanding task to account simultan-
eously for the structural inuences [. . .] while crafting a clear, penetrating narrative
or microanalysis’ Flyvbjerg (2004b, 299-300) admits the diculty behind this idea.
Nonetheless, he continues to criticise that
Researchers generally tend to generate either macro-level or micro-level explanations,
ignoring the critical connections. Empirical work follows the same pattern. Instead
of research that attempts to link macro-level factors and actors’ choices in a specic
phenomenon, scholars tend to dichotomize. Structural analyses and studies of actors each
receive their share of attention, but in separate projects, by separate researchers.
Flyvbjerg then summarises research projects that exceptionally work in the overlap-
ping areas of macro- and microanalysis. Thus, ‘moving beyond agency and structure,’
according to him, is dicult but possible. In the next chapter we will discuss how the
critical realist concept of stratication justies this move.
In regard to emancipation, we nd guidelines ve, seven, and nine: to look at practice
before discourse; to ask ‘how?’ and do narrative; and to dialogue with a polyphony of
voices. ‘[P]ractice is life’ is the ‘motto for phronetic planning research’ (296). Because
discourse is considered dicult to assess, and often misrepresents what real practices
are, the idea is to avoid it. In comparison to discourse, practices are manifestations of
what really happens and what is habitual in the context that is investigated, according
to Flyvbjerg.
The seventh guideline demands to ask “how?” For responses, Flyvbjerg (2004b,
298-9) proposes story-telling (narrative) as one legitimate method. This is because
‘event and conjuncture are crucial’ and history and historicity are considered central.
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Doing narrative is argued to be the one (if not the only) legitimate method for properly
explaining events and their conjunctures (see also Landman 2012). Arguably, the focus
on historical context comes with a neglect of spatial context. We will deal with this
dilemma in more detail soon since it can be considered phronetic social science’s greatest
weakness.
Dialoguing with a polyphony of voices is the ninth and last advice. In this context,
the implicit call for challenging the dominant status quo with help of the four key
questions is striking. By debating undesirable power relations, phronetic research aims
at disclosing them. In turn, this shall challenge the modus operandi they constitute
within the research context. The phronetic approach ‘incorporates, and, if successful, is
itself incorporated into, a polyphony of voices, with no one voice, including that of the
researcher, claiming nal authority’ (Flyvbjerg 2004b, 300). Hence, successful phronetic
research stimulates a dialogue about the dominant state of aairs while considering
that its conclusions and advices are not necessarily correct and fruitful. This aspect
is similar to Bhaskar’s standpoint that the philosophical ontology he developed is far
from ultimate, and transitive objects are subject to change.
Let us now turn to tension points. They are essential for phronesis since they are
‘power relations that are particularly susceptible to problematization and thus to change,
because they are fraught with dubious practices, contestable knowledge and potential
conict’ (Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram 2012a, 288). They empower researchers to
pursue three crucial tasks in phronetic inquiries (290):
1. actively identifying dubious practices within policy and social action;
2. undermining these practices through problematisation;
3. and constructively helping to develop new and better practices.
The overall idea of phronetic social science is to answer the four key questions
by means of the guidelines; to nd tensions points while undertaking this inquiry; to
actively stimulate a dialogue about the ndings and the object of study; and to challenge
dominant habits associated within the power relations that were uncovered (Flyvbjerg
2004b; Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram 2012a; Flyvbjerg 2012).
3.3 Lack of spatiality and other weaknesses
How do scholars react to these claims? The most general concern claims that Aris-
totelian and Foucauldian thought are incompatible. Caterino calls the connection of an
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Aristotalian view of social inquiry, which is founded on the idea of collaboration, and
Foucault’s reections on power an ‘uneasy mix’ (Caterino 2013, 749; see also Caterino
2006). In their defence, Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram (2013, 759) argue that collabor-
ation is not a necessary criteria for phronetic research. While they are right averting
Caterino’s argument, they do it the wrong way. Collaboration is a necessary criteria
for phronetic inquiry because it is part of every dialogue; and as we have learned,
pursuing dialogue is one of the guidelines of the approach. On the rst read it seems
that ‘collaboration’ and ‘power’ cannot go along; however, as we saw in regard to the
Foucauldian interpretation, ‘power’ is inherent to every relation. This means that power
is also part of any collaboration. Hence, at least in respect to ‘collaboration’ and ‘power’
the Aristotelian and Foucauldian thought go along indeed.
Another side raises the critique that the ideas behind phronetic social science hinge
on an epistemological and methodological shift but neglect ontology. Gunnell (2013,
747-8) underlines that the inherent dierence between natural and social inquiry is not
the modus operandi but ‘the fact that natural science presents rather than represents
its subject matter’ (748) That is, the dierence lies in the subject matter (the scientic
ontology), and not in the methodology. In like manner, when Flyvbjerg refers to
‘reality’ in his third guideline, it remains unclear what ‘reality’ means for the phronetic
researcher. None of the contributions considered2 explicitly mention ontological (and
epistemological) foundations that pave the way for phronetic social science in the rst
place. While we already encountered arguments of this type in the previous chapters,
we also saw that critical realism provides solutions by means of transcendental realism’s
encompassing ontology.
This also stands in connection to focus on the ‘little things.’ Which scale is to choose?
What are the entities phronetic social science is concerned of? While the argument
is to move beyond agency and structure, the future phronetic social scientist gets no
hint where to move to. Yes, the structure/agency and related debates are misleading.
Nonetheless, the reason why these debates emerged prevail: things on dierent scales
behave dierently. In the previous section I already indicated that stratication can be
helpful in this context, which we will discuss in the subsequent chapter.
In the same breath we can mention that ‘social and historical context,’ while believed
important in phronetic research (Flyvbjerg 2004b, 291), remains widely undened. From
the standpoint of transcendental realism we can agree that both are crucial, but it is
2. Flyvbjerg ([2001] 2011), Flyvbjerg (2004b), and Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram (2012c)
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only in transcendental realism where there are eorts taken to explain what a social
and historical contextualisation means (cf. Roberts 2001). In critical naturalism both
aspects are emphasised in the transformational model of social activity. Phronetic social
science lacks such an explanation.
In relation to the neglect of ontology we can also mention the subordination of
theory to practice. According to Flyvbjerg and his proponents, in the social sciences
we have too much stressed the importance of theory. As demanded by the Perestroika
movement, we shall focus on the practical implication of our research. But it remains
unclear what Flyvbjerg means when he talks of ‘theory.’ I assume he speaks of ‘theory’
as it is depicted by positivists. If that is the case, I agree. However, if he uses the term
to describe everything abstract (like Bhaskar does), I question his standpoint.
It is not necessarily the focus on theory but the focus on theory production in
positivist virtue that should be of concern. In the recent chapter we saw that we need
theory, that is, everything abstract or imperceivable, to make sense of the world because
our world must be understood as constituted of abstract entities (intransitive and
transitive objects of knowledge). Theory and practice stand in a reciprocal relationship.
Moreover, transitive objects of knowledge (theories, models, et cetera) are socially
produced, that is, they stem from a certain kind of practice. In this sense, ‘theory
production’ is necessary for scientic endeavour.
But because of the dominance of positivism in the debated disciplines, the term
‘theory production’ is used to describe the development of models that must necessarily
include capabilities to predict. This turn toward a positive understanding of theory,
I criticise in line with Flyvbjerg. As we have learned, prediction is impossible in
open systems. Society is an open system, and as such the requirement of predictive
theories (the positivsts’ conception of theory) is misleading. We need theory not the
way it is understood by positivists, but as a concept to refer to everything abstract or
imperceivable. Otherwise, scientic progress would be impossible because we would
ignore that transitive objects of knowledge are necessary to produce new knowledge.
Likewise, Flyvbjerg proclaims that academics should shift their focus from discourse
toward practice. However, especially in geopolitics there are voices which advocate for
discourse to become the centre of discussions (for example Tuathail 1996; cf. Müller
2008). I consider both practice and discourse as important elements of social and spatial
development. What we think and talk about is what we are, as is what we practice
and vice versa. This argument is also represented in Bhaskar’s transformational model
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of social activity, where society consciously produces and unconsciously reproduced
the conditions of their making. Certainly, we can speak of ‘practising discourse,’ thus
Flyvbjerg’s argument becomes a dead end (see also Müller 2008; Thrift 2000). Because
‘to discourse’ is a practice by and of itself it may not be neglected in social inquiries.
Discourse and practice are in a reciprocal relationship too.
Speaking of discourse, Flyvbjerg himself argues to pursue dialogue with a polyphony
of voices. Let us shortly scrutinise this guideline. Dialogue depends on third parties.
Thus, for successful phronetic inquiry, researchers become dependent on third parties.
If nobody responds, the research they pursue will loose relevance. Flyvbjerg (2004b,
294) says that ‘focus on relations of values of power [. . .] typically creates interest in
the research by parties outside the research community.’ From my point of view, this
does not need to be the case necessarily because creating interest is only possible if
people understand the inherent connection between present social practices and its
inuence on society. This connection is also present in Bhaskar’s transformational
model of social activity; and, as we will see below, of essential concern when developing
emancipatory research.
The question remains whether pursuing dialogue is always possible – especially
when the phronetic researchers is part of the power relations that they address. I
suppose that dominant actors in a particular case under study practise their power
eciently and successfully (as do in turn the dominated, to make the picture complete).
They adapt to particular rules and ascertain specic behaviour which is benecial under
the circumstances that surround their practices. How is a researcher, as an, at least at the
beginning, external participant and actor within these relations able to challenge them?
How can researchers make themselves heard? For sure, there needs to be gained a lot
of knowledge, power must be practised permanently, and many eorts must be taken
to eventually dispute the status quo. An example is one concern raised by Flyvbjerg
(2013), criticising the press support of the American Planning Association for submitters
of articles. The discourse regards the submission of an article (Flyvbjerg, Holm and
Buhl 2002) which was accompanied by controversial behaviour by the association. This
behaviour is exposed but found response by Bolan (2015) only recently – the response
took thirteen years (see also Flyvbjerg 2015). Challenging the status quo is dicult.
We have discussed some of the more general concerns, now let us turn to the most
crucial aw: the lack of spatiality. The ‘spatial turn’ is generally regarded as an important
movement within the social sciences (Warf and Arias 2009; concerning geography see
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also Lossau and Lippuner 2004; concerning international relations see also Iqbal and
Starr 2015). Certainly, if we want to introduce phronetics to geographico-political
disciplines, we must develop a way to include spatiality. At the current stage, the
opposite is the case: While Flyvbjerg’s original contribution was written for the general
social scientist ([2001] 2011), later texts address and adapt the phronetic approach
for particular sub-disciplines within the social sciences (Flyvbjerg 2004b; see also
Landman 2012). Even though also adapted for a journal concerned with spatial planning,
phronetics misses any thought that contributes an explanation of its standpoint toward
space.
Even recent work (Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram 2012c) lacks an account of
spatiality. While the collection includes one article (see Basu 2012) that makes spati-
ality within phronetics subject of discussion , Soja (2013) considers this contribution
not sucient. According to him, the lack of spatiality in phronetic social science is
compelling because Foucault’s concept of power incorporates space as an important
factor (see for example Foucault 2004). Soja argues that Foucault’s commonly known
concept of ‘knowledge/power’ is actually a triad of power, knowledge, and space (see
also Crampton and Elden 2007). Thus Soja demands that ‘phronesis from the start needs
to be seen as simultaneously social, historical, and spatial’ (Soja 2013, 753). He adds
that ‘one of the most signicant unexplored elds of phronetic social science [. . .] [is its
application] to urban spatial causality and the generative eects of urban agglomeration’
(755). Concentrating on ‘inequality, hierarchy, and injustice’, according to Soja, is ‘a key
step in the spatialization of phronetic social science’ and an important cornerstone for
the future development of phronetic inquiry. In light of this criticism it is striking that
the lack of spatiality was admitted as shortcoming by Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram
(2013).
3.4 On theory and practice
In light of what we discussed in the previous chapters, phronetic social science is a highly
normative approach that objects to naturalism and reductionism. Phronetics shares
this objection with critical realism. But, on the contrary to critical realism, phronetics
misses a conceptualisation of an underlying ontology to justify such claims. While
Bhaskar focuses on a theory to conceptualise how the world must be like, Flyvbjerg
concentrates on the development of a praxis for researchers to deal with this world. He
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is more concerned with methodology. In other words, Bhaskar assembles the theoretical
framework under which normative research such as Flyvbjerg’s can be conducted,
and Flyvbjerg, without considering ontological presumptions, provides a sophisticated
guide on how to do so in praxis.
We can clearly see notions of the realist philosophy in Flyvbjerg’s arguments. Some
of them we already discussed in course of criticising phronetic’s pillars. Now, let us
take a closer look on the following questions about power relations that I selected from
the quotation already cited above to make the connection even more evident (Flyvbjerg
[2001] 2011, 123):
How has the active exercise of power [. . .] aected the possibilities for the further exercise
of power, with the resulting reinforcement of certain power relations and the attenuation
of others? [. . .] How have these relations made certain rationalities possible and others
impossible [. . .]? How can games of power be played dierently?
For these questions to make sense, Flyvbjerg must presuppose that social forms
(such as individuals or organisations) can be held responsible for their actions. He
presupposes that they aect others. Most importantly, the last question implies that
social forms obtain freedom to inuence other social forms. The argument builds
upon Collier’s concept of stratied freedom. These aspects show that Flyvbjerg’s
argumentation is realist, at least to some extent. We can literally see that positions,
practices, and relations are essential to his thinking – as they are in critical realism. The
power relations Flyvbjerg addresses with phronetics, make social forms consciously
produce and/or unconsciously reproduce the conditions of their making, as Bhaskar
argues.
Even though I consider it a coincidence that the follow-up publication of Making
Social Science Matter is called ‘Real Social Science’ (Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram
2012c, emphasis by me), there is indeed some essence behind the adjective. Based on
arguments that stem from practice solely, Flyvbjerg develops ideas on how to disclose
what lies beyond the empirical. Albeit the lack of clear ontological arguments, the
approach propagated by him is to some extent a guide on how to pursue critical realism
in the social sciences.
Only ‘to some extent’ because some aspects such as Flyvbjerg’s diculty to concep-
tualise ‘context’ or to argue for normativity remain supercial. An argumentation that
solely stems from praxis cannot spur an encompassing research approach. We need the
abstract, the theoretical to enhance our endeavours in scientic research. Here, it is
striking that none of the publications concerning phronetics refers to works by neither
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Bhaskar, Collier or Sayer though these could support phronetic research by means of
philosophy. For example, the concept of false believes and stratied freedom can justify
that phronetics includes a normative momentum. To mention another example, the
transformational model of social activity can support phronetic researchers to concep-
tualise context. Misguided positions, practices and relations Flyvbjerg and his followers
tackle by conceptualising ‘tension points.’ Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter,
stratication can help to move beyond the structure/agency dichotomy. Thus, critical
realism can strengthen phronetic social science.
Hence, on the contrary to Flyvbjerg, I urge to consider both practice and theory.
They are a benecial interplay rather than a mutual threat. Critical realism can free
phronetic social science from being criticised as unscientic and arbitrary because of
its normative momentum. If false believes can spur misguided positions, practices, and
relations, it will be unwise to let them perpetuate. Conversely, misguided positions,
practices, and relations – or ‘tension points’ as conceptualised in phronetics – can be
disclosed by means of the cornerstones Flyvbjerg developed for his approach. The
pillars that Flyvbjerg developed and critical realism are mutually benecial.
In this chapter we encountered an inuential critical and emancipatory tradition: phron-
etic social science. Its founder Bent Flyvbjerg re-claims the interplay of episteme, techne,
and phronesis, and combines it with a Foucauldian concept of power to object to preval-
ent practices within the social sciences. The resulting research approach consists of
three pillars that provide key questions, guidelines, and the concept of ‘tension points’
to challenge misguided actions.
While we raised methodological concerns, we saw that the approach shares sim-
ilarities with critical realism. To mention the most important: rst, both incorporate
a self-critical momentum; second, Flyvbjerg emphasises the socio-historical context
as Bhaskar does by means of the transformational model of social activity; and third,
Flyvbjerg’s focus on the practice of power is reected in Bhaskar’s focus on positions,
practices, and relations. Moreover, we argued that the ontological guidelines raised by
phronetics can benet from critical realist’s philosophical ontology. Hence, it stands to
reason that the two approaches are mutually supporting grounds.
In search for a critical and emancipatory approach for political geography, the
decisive weakness of phronetics is the lack of spatiality. Nevertheless, its ideas can
be of guidance for developing a methodology based on critical realism since their key
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tenets go hand in hand. Not to mention, that the approach has the potential to deal
with spatial inequalities. The potential simply has not been put to use yet.
Thus, in the next chapter we will focus on the fusion of the philosophy and the
methodology while incorporating a suitable account on spatiality.
Chapter 4
Getting spatial: transcendental phronetic political
geography
We saw, critical realism and phronetic social science can help to free inquiries in the
social sciences from being criticised as unscientic and arbitrary but both lack explicit
considerations of spatiality. For geographico-political disciplines, this calls to search for
a tradition that shares their ideas but incorporates spatial thinking. We will summarise
these notions in the rst section of this chapter.
In the second section, we will encounter Yves Lacoste who demands academics
to develop a necessarily spatial and responsible understanding of social life. He has
theorised about a ‘systemic analysis’ that helps to engage in phenomena that perpetuate
over multiple scales. As we will see, his conceptualisation of géopolitiques is original
and distinct, thus a simple translation to its Anglophone counter-part ‘geopolitics’
cannot meet it. His ideas fortify the relevance of geography as not only a scientic
discipline among many others but a socially and politically relevant endeavour for every
citizen. These ideas are propagated in the journal Hérodote that was founded by him.
Lacoste and his followers press for political and emancipatory debates within geography.
Because for him ‘everything is geopolitical,’ (Mamadouh 1998, 239) spatiality becomes
a key factor for research in the social sciences.
After considering his accounts, we will synthesise what we have discussed in the
previous chapters in a new research programme called ‘transcendental phronetic polit-
ical geography.’ It is a combination of ideas of critical realism, phronetic social science,
and Lacoste’s Hérodotian school that provides certain advantages over traditional ap-
proaches. Choosing critical realism as philosophical foundation allows us to use both
typically positivist and typically interpretivist strategies to pursue research. Coupled
with stratication we are not restricted to analyse phenomena from within a single
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scale, but demanded to zoom in and out while pursuing research. In this context, phron-
etic social science gives advice on what to pay attention to for producing practical
research outcomes. We will reconsider its four power questions, adapting them to spur
transcendental arguments, and re-discover false believes as tension points. Lacoste’s
approach shows how the proposed inquiries can be made spatial. To make this clear we
will read his systemic approach through the eyes of transcendental realists and connect
it to the concept of the world being stratied. This will be accompanied by arguing for
the importance of geographico-political education in virtue of Lacoste’s demands.
In the last section of this chapter, we will locate the new research programme within
prevalent traditions that investigate the geographico-political and dene its advantages.
By doing so we will clarify its scope and what to expect from it. The research programme
is shaped for challenging dominant practices in the geographico-political world that
perpetuate over dierent scales, with multiple types of actors involved. Its focus lies on
providing research outcomes that have impact on related processes in question. The
programme engages with the social production of transitive objects of knowledge. Thus,
it makes political geography an intrinsic element of social practice.
4.1 Setting the stage for a new research programme
Before arguing for the novel research programme proposed, let us summarise and
contextualise what we have learned in the previous chapters. In the rst chapter we
discussed the philosophy of (social) science in general. We categorised key debates
of it about naturalism, reductionism, and normativity. A naturalist pursuit of social
science imposes the ontology and/or epistemology of the natural sciences on the social
sciences. Ontological naturalism equalises objects of study of the natural sciences and
objects of study of the social sciences; in pursuit of epistemological naturalism, scientists
impose a very similar (if not the same) modus operandi of the natural sciences on the
social sciences. In connection to naturalism we encountered reductionism and learned
that scholars tend to reduce the social sciences to the natural sciences ontologically,
epistemologically, and/or theoretically. While doing so, social inquiries (and what they
study) loose their stance as distinct and equally important endeavours. We then objected
to naturalism and reductionism in light of general concerns in the philosophy of social
science – and added further concerns through what we have learned about both critical
realism and phronetic social science in the subsequent chapters.
4.1. Setting the stage for a new research programme 59
Further, we reconsidered the fact/value dichotomy. We concluded that scientic
inquiries cannot be value-free and any science incorporates normative notions, espe-
cially the social sciences. Thus, we could argue that social sciences do not need to
exclude normative accounts per se. Explanatory critiques, as conceptualised by critical
realism, and phronesis, as underlined by phronetic social science, demand critical ap-
proaches and make social emancipation possible. Concurrently, both critical realism
and phronetic social science disallow arbitrary advices and demand scientic pursuits
of a particular kind to facilitate research.
Let us revise how this is possible. The core of critical realism, that is transcendental
realism, permits critical and emancipatory research by developing a distinct philosophical
ontology (cf. scientic ontologies/epistemologies). By use of transcendental arguments,
Bhaskar can distinguish between intransitive and transitive knowledge, three dierent
domains (real, actual, and empirical), and conceptualises the world as stratied. Taking
up these ideas, Collier argues that, in a stratied world, strata can be in relations
of composition and emergence, which allows both analytic and holistic approaches.
By appreciating stratied freedom, he reasons that we are responsible for both our
successes and our failures. Traditional philosophies, on the contrary, failed to develop a
distinct philosophical ontology. They suer from so-called ‘epistemic fallacy,’ that is,
they impose their epistemological concerns on ontology, and incite the aforementioned
problems in regard to naturalism, reductionism, and normativity.
Like proponents of critical realism, Flyvbjerg objects to traditional scientic endeav-
ours by means of phronetic social science. Advancing ideas of Aristotle and Foucault,
his concept of phronetic inquiries intends to make social science matter again. That
is, he instructs social scientists to increase practical and socially relevant outcomes of
their endeavours. He demands that scientists focus on power relations while accepting
particular guidelines (of ontological, epistemological, and ethical type). These guidelines
shall help to answer four questions that frame every phronetic inquiry. In the end,
according to Flyvbjerg, phronetic scientists can illuminate tension points and provide a
base for challenging prevalent but questionable habits within society.
Disciplines that are concerned about everything geographico-political (such as
political geography, geopolitics, and international relations) meet both the traditional
ideas and the more recent streams presented here diversely. While they all try to
comprehend the relationship between society and space, the complexity of the object
under study has been spurring multiple disciplines, sub-disciplines, and methodologies
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each trying to address particular concerns in question. For example, we mentioned the
dilemma of defending approaches by means of philosophical foundations, and thus the
incitement of inconclusive debates in regard to international relations.
While a debate about critical realism spurred within international relations only
recently, it has a much longer tradition in geography. Nevertheless, critical realism is
misunderstood in both elds. In international relations the variety of ‘realisms’ makes
a distinction dicult; the contributions to Millennium adding further intricacy. On the
contrary, in geography researchers welcomed critical realism as criticism toward the
behaviourist movements in the second half of last century. As we saw, geographers
have been appreciating the versatility of critical realism, and started to form their own
understanding of a critical realist geography. This development is highly criticised
by Mäki and Oinas (2004) because the core of critical realism was not only formed
but de-formed to ‘GeoRealism,’ a type of realism that comes with multiple drawbacks.
GeoRealism cannot keep up with CoreRealism. This makes reconsidering the core of
realism (as is done in the text at hand) for the discipline of geography even more urgent.
While we appreciated the ‘false promise of philosophical foundations’ (Monteiro
and Ruby 2009), we can see that critical realism is a dierent kind of foundation. Since
it develops a distinct philosophical ontology, it must be considered rather an add-
on than a competitor to the traditional foundations. Its philosophical arguments are
encompassing in the sense that it allows for research that stems from both classical
empiricism and transcendental idealism (while objecting to ‘anything goes approaches’).
It is an umbrella term, and actually marks the rst time that a distinct philsophy of
science was developed – the other approaches are mere philosophies for science. In
traditional accounts, science becomes an epiphenomenon of nature, or it imposes its
epistemology on ontological grounds.1
What is the stance of phronetic social science? On the one hand, it had great
inuence on political science and has been a driving force for the Perestroika movement.
On the other hand, the approach lacks spatiality, which is a crucial shortcoming. We
saw that, while there is only a single contribution applying phronesis to spatial research
in their practical guide to phronesis, Flyvbjerg and his followers can do nothing more
1. Important sidenote: This is not to claim that the proposed approach is better than others. This is to
claim that critical realism has advantages over other philosophical foundations. Even research that is
conducted in virtue of critical realism can – partially – have the form of research that stems from the
other foundations. The crucial dierence is that critical realist research for example, is open to both
holistic and analytical approaches, or supports mixed-method research.
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than admitting this decisive aw.
Both critical realism and phronetic social science emphasise that social inquiries
must include a socio-relational and tempo-relational momentum, but they fail to con-
sider space. Thus, they lack an essential ingredient for being applied to disciplines
concerned with geographico-political phenomena. But this should not prevent us from
taking their ideas into account because emancipatory approaches of similar kind show
that it is possible to incorporate a spatial momentum too. Thus, we should not give
up what we were taught by critical realism and phronetic social science but try to
consolidate what we have learned with what an approach that incorporates a spatial
momentum can teach us.
The approach I have in mind is the conceptualisation of géopolitiques by Yves Lacoste.
As we will see in the next section, his research has been neglected by the Anglophone
school of political geography though it is a unique and enlightening tradition for the
discipline. While it lacks an ontological and epistemological base to serve as a complete
research programme, its emancipatory notions and Lacoste’s idea of a ‘systemic analysis’
will help us to conate critical realism and phronetic social science to a new research
programme.
4.2 Finding spatiality: Lacoste’s géopolitiques
Yves Lacoste’s approach toward géopolitiques is an example for a nationally, and re-
gionally inuential school of geography in Europe. Its leading journal Hérodote is,
next to independent publications of Lacoste and his followers, the main resource for
geographico-political thinking in France. The domestic success notwithstanding, it
is echoed outside of his main audience only scarcely. The school is overlooked by
Anglophone, European, and scholars around the world. This is even more surprising
since the French culture of geography has contributed to the revival of ‘geopolitics’
essentially, and Hérodote celebrates its 40th anniversary this year.
In Lacoste’s concept of géopolitiques ‘everything is geopolitical’ (Mamadouh 1998).
Originating from a tradition of Geography as propagated by Vidal de la Blache, Lacoste
proposed a new interpretation of geography’s purpose that opposes to quantitative and
theoretical turns within geography in the 1970s. The title of his famous proclamation
La géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre (‘Geography mainly exists for the sake
of making war’) defends the relationship between geographical and political thinking,
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thus emphasises the socio-political momentum of geography (Lacoste [1976] 2014). We
can see his pamphlet as an indirect attempt to popularise ‘geopolitics’ (the conjunction
of geographical and political research and thought) once again. These ideas nd support
by the vast contributions in the journal Hérodote.
In fact, Lacoste had stressed the possibility of a critical discipline that contests geo-
political ideologies long before Tuathail (1996) did with his idea of ‘critical geopolitics’
that is known to mark the post-structuralist extreme of geographico-political thinking
in the Anglophone world (Kofroň 2012). By using the plural form géopolitiques, the
Hérodotian school underlines the variety of subjective perceptions and standpoints
on everything that is geographico-political (see Claval 2000; Mamadouh 1998; see also
Giblin 2012). In this context the school emphasises that the purpose of geography is to
serve society and emancipate it from ideologies established by those in control (Lacoste
1984). Hence, Lacoste pioneered in the critical sub-eld of political geography long
before anybody did in the Anglophone world.
This makes it even more surprising that the tradition has been overlooked. In
regard to English-speaking academia, Hepple (2000) argues that the neglect stems from
a mutual lack of interest: neither Anglophone scholars are interested in the French
tradition nor are Lacoste and his followers interested in Anglophone schools (see also
Fall 2008; Ehlers 2004; Harris 2001). Similarly, Claval (2000, 243) juxtaposes the traditions
concerning their perception on the importance of theory. As we will see, Lacoste and
his followers have been neglecting theoretical debates although the Anglophone world
of geography deems theory an important factor.
In regard to European academia, scholars in proximity neither mention Lacoste’s
work in overviews of geopolitical thinking (Kofroň 2012; Reuber 2012) nor in analyses
of geopolitical codes of foreign countries (Laš and Baar 2014). The adapted version
of Hérodote in Italy is an exception to prove the rule (Claval 2000, 261-2). Rather,
the neglect resembles the overall pattern that the audience of European journals of
geography is nationally (at best regionally) restricted (Bajerski 2011; Bajerski and
Siwek 2012). Because of this, European scholars of geography focus on publishing in
Anglophone journals (Aalbers and Rossi 2007; Paasi 2013). As a result, although we are
familiar with the work of French academics of the same generation, for example Michel
Foucault’s, the endeavours of Yves Lacoste are (at best) often only mentioned, instead
of critically assessed or acknowledged.
The more important it is to urge reading the French tradition as an insightful con-
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tribution for understanding everything geographico-political. Since Lacoste considers
himself a geographer focusing on géopolitiques (see Lacoste 2012, 26), in his argumenta-
tion he departs from geography and lets the discipline incorporate notions of political
science. As we have discussed in light of the contributions by for example Criekemans
(2009) and Lossau (2002) before, it is dicult and inconclusive to demarcate between
political geography, geopolitics, and international relations. Thus, in the course of
the text, we have spoken of ‘everything geographico-political’ to clarify that we are
generally concerned about disciplines that deal with the interrelation of politics and
geography. In like manner, we must conceive what Lacoste proposes for geography
to be relevant for the Anglophone concepts of political geography, geopolitics, and
international relations. Since the concept of géopolitiques is distinct from what we
understand as ‘geopolitics’ in the Anglophone discourse, it is an insightful contribution.
4.2.1 Strengths and weaknesses of an emancipatory school
Lacoste’s understanding of a geographico-political endeavour is epitomised in the
following sentence that I freely interpreted from one of his contributions:
The reason for geographers’ existence is to understand and articulate the complexity
of space with its intermingled dierent processes that have unequal dimensions on the
planetary and local scale.2
It tells us two important aspects: one related to researchers that investigate geo-
graphico-political processes, and one about the object under study itself. Let us consider
and contextualise one after the other.
Researchers that deal with geographico-political processes, according to Lacoste,
must be active and they possess responsibility toward society. They must ‘understand
and articulate’ what they investigate. To understand this concern, let us take a closer
look on how the French school evolved.
From the very beginning of his career as geographer, Lacoste has been focusing on
the way meta-narratives were formed within the greater scope of geopolitical thinking
(Claval 2000; Hepple 2000). This intention was triggered by the French intelligentsia
who was dissatised that the events of the 1960s had failed to aect the political regime.
Instead of politicisation, meta-theoretical debates within the eld of geography caused
2. ‘La raison d’être des géographes est de savoir penser l’espace dans sa complexité, en tant
qu’enchevêtrements et interactions très diverses et qui de surcroît ont des dimensions très inégales,
depuis celles d’envergure planétaire jusqu’à celles de certains éléments ponctuels signicatifs dans une
situation locale.’ (Lacoste 1984, 19)
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its quantication and theorisation. Subsequently, Lacoste and his followers focused on
the prevailing narratives within the discipline. They proclaimed that there have had
always existed two geographies since the beginning of the 20th century: one pursued
by the military and decision makers, and one addressed by academic scholars. Lacoste
considered the behaviourist developments of the 1960s and 1970s incapable of engaging
with this dilemma, whilst a discourse concerning the political dimension of geography
had remained due.
Because of this he proclaimed geography to be critical. Otherwise scientists would
misunderstand it – we have already discussed the history of ‘geopolitics’ and its atro-
cious consequences at the beginning of last century. Thus, the Hérodotian tradition has
been supporting a critical momentum within the discipline and considered dierent
understandings of géopolitiques from the beginning. To achieve this, the journal is, next
to traditional journal subscriptions, also available in regular book stores (Claval 2000;
Hepple 2000). This fact, that is, the wish to ease access to geographico-political thought,
also underlines that Lacoste feels responsible for stimulating geographico-political
discourse. While he and his followers try to understand the object under study, they
also feel responsible to articulate what they have learned by publishing their knowledge
not only for scientists but the broader public. Thus, the French tradition is characterised
by both a critical and emancipatory moment. Not to mention that the aforementioned
responsibility demands socially relevant research outcomes. An aspect we already
encountered in phronetic social science (see especially Schram, Flyvbjerg and Landman
2013).
Once the theoretical proclaim of a critical discipline was fully accomplished, the
Hérodotian school has been focusing on its application solely. Although the school
roots in a critique of the epistemological developments of Geography of the 1970s, meta-
theoretical arguments are downplayed today. The school desists from reecting their
own assumptions critically because Lacoste and his followers consider their theoretical
arguments already achieved. According to them, now their only task is to apply what
they have accomplished during the early beginnings of Hérodote. The lack of both
meta-theoretical and theoretical debates limits the potential of the tradition because
‘the elevation of the concrete, complex, specic and particular [. . .] has the corollary
of largely dismissing the abstract, general, ordered and theorized conceptions and
analyses’ (Hepple 2000, 287; see also Claval 2000) – an argument we also made in the
previous chapter. In combination with its rich ontology, the critical and emancipatory
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character, and the resulting normative moment, the lack of (meta-)theoretical arguments
makes the French school appear like an ‘anything goes approach.’ Since theory plays
an important role in the Anglophone tradition, the neglect seems less surprising.
4.2.2 Systemic analyses contextualised
Let us now turn to the second aspect of the quotation that addresses the complexity of
the object under study. As we have already discussed in previous sections in regard
to Varzi (2001) and Smith (2001), geography is rich in ontology because it deals with
a variety of physical and social objects. Lacoste addresses this ‘complexity of space’
by considering everything geopolitical. For him everything consists of its geography
(its physics) and political actors (the society) who form their environment as far as
they can (cf. what we discussed in regard to Kristof 1960). In this context, he considers
‘the (nation-)state as sandwiched between external, supranational and global forces
and internal, regionalist/localist forces of fragmentation’ (Hepple 2000, 287), which
underlines the importance of other political actors despite states on dierent scales.
By doing so, Lacoste engages with a recurring term in political geography: scale.
Mamadouh et al. argue that the interplay between local and global phenomena must be
recognised (Mamadouh, Kramsch and van der Velde 2004, 457; see also Elden 2013):
If scale is a matter of relation, the accent lies on the mutually constitutive character of
scales. No scales exist without the others. No analysis can be limited to one scale: scales
are constructed in relation to each other. The material and discursive production and
reproduction of dierent scales are mutually constitutive and need to be analysed to
understand scales as a process. [. . .] Extra-local relations dene the local. The global is part
of the local as much as the local is part of the global, a statement that is o if one thinks of
scale as size or level, in which the global and the local are either distinct levels or nested in
a specic order [. . .] What is important is to understand the coexistence of multiple scales.
[. . .] While geographers dealing with scale generally underline the relational character of
scale, the unproblematic uses of scale as a pre-given, natural category remain predominant
in the rest of the social sciences.
Scale is a complex concept which should enjoy much more sophisticated discussions
(see for example Claval 2006; Dahlman 2009; Dijkink and Mamadouh 2006; Fainstein
1999; Howitt 2003). In light of this, Brenner argues (Brenner 2001, 605-6; see also
Brenner 2014c):
Scale [. . .] cannot be construed adequately as a system of territorial containers dened
by absolute geographic size (a ‘Russian dolls’ model of scales). Each geographical scale is
constituted through its historically evolving positionality within a larger relational grid
of vertically ‘stretched’ and horizontally ‘dispersed’ sociospatial processes, relations and
interdependencies. Consequently, the very intelligibility of each scalar articulation of a
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social process hinges crucially upon its embeddedness within dense webs of relations to
other scales and spaces.
This leads us to the overall conclusion that we need research methodologies that
are capable of incorporating multiple scales at the same time. An example of such
methodologies is Lacoste’s ‘analyse systemique’ (Lacoste 1984, 22-3). It maintains a
connection to geographical prerequisites through ‘geographical reasoning’ (Giblin 2012;
Hepple 2000; Lacoste 1982a) and engages with the ‘sandwichdness’ of states between
local, supranational, and global forces. Systemic analysis means, on the one hand, to
analyse events on a particular scale, and, on the other hand, to disclose how these events
are related to other scales (see Figure 4.1). The idea behind this is that geographico-
political processes that appear to be the same must be re-contextualised on dierent
scales while appreciating that each of them can inuences others by transcending
through multiple scales (Lacoste [1976] 2014, 237 sqq.; cf. Dussouy 2010).
Unknowingly Lacoste applies in geographical-political endeavours what Roy Bhas-
kar and Bent Flyvbjerg philosophise about in regard to research in the social sciences
in general! Let me explain why.
By analysing events on a particular scale and disclosing how these events are related
to other scales, Lacoste acknowledges Bhaskar’s claim that the world is stratied,
and pursues – in the words of Andrew Collier – horizontal and vertical explanation.
Obviously, since his school lacks a sound philosophical understanding, he fails to realise
that the connection between the events he investigates and the underlying mechanisms
he wants to disclose is much more complex. Nonetheless, systemic analyses can disclose
how events are triggered through others on the same stratum, and how events of one
stratum can explain events of another stratum. Scales (in spatial terms) represent
dierent strata (in transcendental realist terms). The conceptualisation of strata being
in relations of composition and emergence can give justice to both the claims of the
quotations above and the systemic approach as developed by Lacoste.
In this context it is important to paraphrase a remark about political philosophy
made by Collier (1994, 200-4). In this remark, he argues that the practice of designating
sovereignty to particular entities in conceptualisations of the world is misleading. For
him, ‘the illusion of sovereignty as an absolute is a pernicious one’ because it makes
society try to reify it through supporting institutional structures instead of appreciating
‘genuinely multi-levelled democratic structures, with real powers located at each level,
adequate to deal with the problems of that level’ (203). By claiming that particular










Figure 4.1: Systemic analysis as pursued in transcendental phronetic political
geography (adapted from Lacoste [1976] 2014, 237 sqq.). The investigated
geographico-political phenomenon is part of dierent structures on multiple
strata/scales. Because strata/scales are in relations of composition and/or
emergence, the structures can perpetuate on multiple strata/scales or only
appear on a specic stratum/scale. Thus, depending on the stratum/scale
under investigation, the phenomenon can be torn toward dierent or the same
directions. The positions, practices, and relations within and between both
surrounding structures and the phenomeon itself must be scrutinised to disclose
false believes about them.
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administrative levels are sovereign, and others subordinated, we refuse to see the
complexity of reality that stems from the stratication of the world. On the contrary,
transcendental realism can give a full account of ‘scale.’
Like transcendental realism, Lacoste desists from prioritising particular levels; un-
knowingly, he appreciates the stratication of the world and provides means to invest-
igate some of its higher strata through systemic analyses.
Not only does Lacoste apply critical realist notions, he also implements fundamental
ideas of Bent Flyvbjerg. Flyvbjerg also criticises that prevalent research methodologies
cannot full the complex connection between dierent scales. Let us in this context
recall a quotation (Flyvbjerg 2004b, 300):
Researchers generally tend to generate either macro-level or micro-level explanations,
ignoring the critical connections. Empirical work follows the same pattern. Instead
of research that attempts to link macro-level factors and actors’ choices in a specic
phenomenon, scholars tend to dichotomize. Structural analyses and studies of actors each
receive their share of attention, but in separate projects, by separate researchers.
In light of the critical and emancipatory momentum of both phronetic social science
and Lacoste’s approach, we further see that the French tradition of geography has
been providing research examples that are in virtue of Flyvbjerg’s claims. The work
by Lacoste and his followers is research that shares phronetic accounts, but neither
Flyvbjerg nor Lacoste refer to each other.
While we cannot assess every systemic analysis that Lacoste and his followers have
pursued thus far (because such an attempt would go beyond the scope of the thesis), we
can at least mention prominent examples and related debates. An example are accounts
on the roots and stimulations of national, supranational, and global forces on cities.
Lacoste himself has worked on these from the very beginning of his career (for example
in Lacoste 1982b, 1986); related debates (independently from the French school) are
numerous attempts to contextualise the geopolitical situation of Jerusalem (see Jabareen
2010; Pullan et al. 2007; Yacobi and Pullan 2014) and divided cities in general (see Pullan
et al. 2010). Recently, Fregonese (2012) outlined the development of so-called ‘urban
geopolitics’ within the Anglophone sphere of political geography. Further examples
are the contributions by Fainstein (2014) and Brenner (2014a). But in comparison to the
French school, the Anglophone contributions are very young.
Research of such type is in vogue. Thus, conceptualising suitable philosophical
and methodological guidelines for research that tries to understand the geographico-
political relationship over multiple scales falls on fertile ground. Dittmer (2014) who
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argued for the fusion of the concept of assemblage and complexity theory recently, is
an example that tries to deal with these concerns meta-theoretically (see also Squire
2015; Steinberg and Peters 2015).
While all of the aforementioned contributions attempt to raise the concern that
geopolitics, a discipline concerned with the relationship of power and space, must look
beyond the international scale, they fail to provide an encompassing account on how to
justify such an approach philosophically and cannot contextualise such an approach in
light of the debates concerned with naturalism, reductionism, and normativity. On the
contrary, the research programme I propose can address these aspects: Critical Realism
‘allows for the coexistence of holistic and analytical approaches’ (Collier 1994, 118);
phronetic social science provides both arguments for socially relevant research that
may include normative notions and guidelines on how to pursue such research; and
Lacoste’s systemic analyses show that such an attempt is applicable and demonstrates
how it can be translated for spatial disciplines.
Hence, in recent decades the three contributions presented have attempted to shake
the grounds of our traditional perceptions on how to understand the philosophy of
science, how to pursue research within the social sciences, and what the purpose of
political geography is – while pointing toward a similar direction. But all remain neg-
lected in political geography. As we saw, in the rst instance the proposed philosophy
has been de-formed to a futile tool, in the second instance the proposed modus operandi
lacks spatiality, and in the third instance the propositions have been overlooked. As we
will see in the next section, the drawbacks of each of these contributions prevail because
nobody has made the eort to combine them yet. By combining the aforementioned
ideas, we can create a new perspective on how to investigate geographico-political
phenomena.
4.3 Developing transcendental phronetic political geography
Critical realism, phronetic social science, and the Hérodotian approach are united
by their purpose to provide knowledge that challenges prevalent ideas, conceptions,
and/or understandings of phenomena in question. By doing so, all of them consider
that it is possible to change the prevalent geographico-political situations. Critical
realism questions the philosophy of social science and provides a distinct philosophical
ontology that allows critical and emancipatory research. Phronetic social science
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questions the modus operandi in the social science and develops cornerstones for
enhanced social inquiries that aim at the emancipation of society and the improvement
of the prevalent situation. Lacoste’s géopolitiques is an insightful approach developed
within political geography. It delivers a method to deal with spatial contexts that
overcomes prevalent conceptions of the discipline’s scope while including a critical and
emancipatory momentum.
In search for a way to investigate, question, and improve the living conditions of the
left-behind that are manifested in informal urban settlements, fusing the ideas behind
the three approaches looks promising. Together they provide a philosophical founda-
tion, epistemological guidance, and a method especially developed for spatial contexts.
This section takes and adapts the three approaches for a fusion I call ‘transcendental
phronetic political geography.’ By means of transcendental realism we justify phronetic
inquiries within geography that take the inherent connection between political pro-
cesses and physical space into account. The proposed research programme happens
around four key concepts – power, space, scale, and justice – whose connection to the
three approaches will be discussed in the next sub-section. After this discussion, we will
organise particular research questions and guidelines based on the three approaches.
Once we reconsidered the cornerstones of the fusion, in the subsequent section we will
discuss for which type of inquiries the approach can be used.
4.3.1 On power, space, scale, and justice
The research programme that I propose addresses four key concepts of political geo-
graphy in particular: power, space, scale, and justice. On the one hand, each pillar of
the approach addresses these concepts in its own way; on the other hand, we can nd
similarities in the attitude that they develop toward the concepts.
Power is of special concern in both critical realism and phronetic social science.
Flyvbjerg’s conceptualisation of power, which is deeply connected to the one by Fou-
cault, sees power immanent in every practice and relation. Power does not point toward
one but multiple directions. The dominant and the dominated are in a relation of power.
Power is not limited to individuals but inherent in every type of relation. In light of what
we learned about transcendental realism, it seems to me that Flyvbjerg is on the right
track to understand how to relate structures in the world, but (as others) has not been
able to dierentiate the real from the empirical (and the actual) yet. While considering
transcendental realism, we saw that ‘power’ does not quite resemble how underlying
mechanisms of the real operate. Bhaskar argues that, rather than speaking of causal
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powers, we must speak of tendencies when we conceptualise relations. Things tend to
behave a certain way. So, instead of a static conceptualisation of the relation between
structures, we must provide a more dynamic conceptualisation. While Flyvbjerg has a
xed conception of power relations, dynamism becomes visible in Collier’s argument
for stratied freedom that allows for relations to change because structures reconsider
their practices.
On the contrary to power, space is neither addressed by critical realism nor phronetic
social science. In the transformational model of social activity, Bhaskar mainly addresses
time by considering scientic progress and the production and reproduction of society
in history. Phronetic social science lacks spatiality entirely. On the contrary, space,
and especially the connection between space and society, is central to the works by
Yves Lacoste. In his account, everything becomes geopolitical, as Mamadouh put it. His
systemic analyses can help to acquire a better understanding of geographico-political
relations that often perpetuate on multiple scales.
As we saw, stratication can explain our conception of dierent scales. When strata
emerge from others, we can perceive them as scales: from the individual human being, to
smaller groups, nations, states, supranational entities, international organisations, and
the international system as a whole. Since dierent strata are in relation of emergence
and/or composition, scales are in relation too; thus, stratication can do justice to the
concerns about scales mentioned above. Hence, it is important to move beyond agency
and structure, as Flyvbjerg argues; and investigate the relations of dierent scales/strata,
as epitomised by Lacoste’s systemic analyses and conceptualised by Collier through
vertical explanation.
Since each of the three approaches aims at critical and emancipatory research,
they are related to the concept of justice. In general, the idea is to generate research
outcomes that help to develop truth claims. In turn, these claims counter betrayal
and false accounts on geographico-political phenomena. These ideas are reected in
the critical realist conceptions of false believes and explanatory critiques; Flyvbjerg’s
argument to incorporate phronesis into contemporary research; and Lacoste’s demand
for socially responsible geographers.
4.3.2 Research questions and guidelines as leitmotiv
For phronetic social science, Flyvbjerg has developed four key questions that frame
every type of phronetic inquiry: Where are we going with a specic problematic?
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Who gains and who losses, and by which mechanisms of power? Is this development
desirable? What, if anything, should we do about it?
In the previous chapter, we have already discussed these questions and concluded
that they come with certain deciencies. Especially the third and fourth questions
seem to encourage subjective and highly normative understandings of research that
we considered dangerous. While a normative momentum within sciences is possible,
this does not imply that every attitude toward a problematic in question is valid. These
concerns notwithstanding, since questions of this form provide a good way of framing
future research of the kind that is proposed here, I suggest similar but adapted versions
of the questions.
My version of the questions incorporates central ideas of critical realism, prevent
possible misunderstandings of conceptualising power (as discussed above), and position
systemic analyses as point of departure. As we have learned in the chapter about critical
realism, false believes are the roots for misguided actions. Thus, we must apply the
best explanatory critique possible to disclose them although the dierentiation between
real, actual, and empirical prevents us from unveiling our false believes easily. So, the
questions aim at simplifying our endeavour to produce explanatory critiques as good as
possible to counter these believes. They are the rst four cornerstones of transcendental
phronetic political geography.
1. What are the geographico-political phenomena of the object under study?
We must acquire an overview of what is apparent to us in regard to the geograph-
ico-political topic in question. By investigating geographico-political phenomena,
we deal with higher strata that relate to other strata in terms of composition and
emergence. While we cannot produce closed systems on these strata articially,
which would help us to get a glimpse of the real, formulating what appears to
us into words helps us at least to dene the object under study and to get an
overview of the problematic.
The rst and second question are best answered by pursuing systemic analyses in
virtue of Lacoste. Once we can answer the rst question, we have our topic formulated
and at hand (by means of maps, textual descriptions, pictures, interviews and other
techniques). At this stage of our research, we have yet mainly pursued horizontal
explanation and suggested cornerstones of our vertical explanation that we still owe.
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2. What must the geographico-political positions, practices, and relations be like
(what are they and how do they work) for these phenomena to perpetuate?
Our systemic analysis and explanatory critique continue by addressing the second
question. We start to interrelate dierent scales and contextualise how practices
work on dierent scales in separation.
On and below the geographico-political strata there are underlying mechanisms
in the real that make the geographico-political tend to be the way it is. Since the
geographico-political strata are in relation of composition and/or emergence with
others, we can pursue vertical explanation.
By pursuing vertical explanation we will see that the special relations to other
strata impose certain restrictions on the strata that we investigate, but the latter’s
emergent character gives their structures also stratied freedom. We must unveil
what imposes restrictions and how the structures produce and reproduce their
stratied freedom.
Bhaskar taught that research within the social sciences must focus on positions,
practices, and relations. Social forms which represent the framework of these
aspects are only relatively enduring because they are consciously produced and
unconsciously reproduced by themselves. We must disclose what all of the three
mean in regard to our object under study, and how they operate. We might have
already pictured some of them by answering the rst question. By answering the
second question, we get a better picture of how the aspects stand in connection
to other strata, that is, to other scales.
3. What must the (false) believes be like (what are they and how do they work) for the
positions, practices, and relations to be consciously produced and unconsciously
reproduced by society?
We saw that social forms continuously reproduce the conditions of their making.
In this context, (false) believes are the reasons for our actions. By asking the
third question, we aim to disclose what these (false) believes are and how they
perpetuate within dierent social forms so that the prevalent positions, practices,
and relations prevail.
Believes are false, if they have the characteristics of tension points: ‘fraught
with dubious practices, contestable knowledge and potential conict’ (Flyvbjerg,
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Landman and Schram 2012a, 288). We must necessarily connect what we learn
here to what we disclosed by answering the second question.
The combination of stratied freedom and false believes is toxic. Stratied freedom
makes human agency possible and enables us to act because of reason that we
nd in believes. These believes can be false and result in misguided actions. By
disclosing false believes, our research gets a critical and emancipatory momentum.
Showing that the believes are false, we provide reasons to drop them. This opens
up the possibility to adopt other believes. The explanatory critique that we provided by
answering the rst, second, and third question implicitly provides alternatives.
4. What would the geographico-political phenomena be like if we were to adopt
other believes instead?
In this context it is important to note that it is ‘other believes’ and not ‘another’
or ‘a true belief;’ the plural form is crucial. By disclosing a false believe we
cannot necessarily claim that its opposite version is true. The world, especially
on strata that we consider as social scientists, is not binary. Through research of
the proposed type we can show that prevalent believes are false and the resulting
actions misguided, but we cannot necessarily claim that facing the other way will
make things ‘better.’
Nonetheless, our research provided us with insights on how things go wrong.
And, as Collier (1994, 165) argues, ‘[b]y seeing how something goes wrong we
nd out more about the conditions of its working properly than we ever would by
observing it working properly. [. . .] Mechanisms which are normally disguised
by their closer interaction with other ones break loose and so are actualized,
whereas they normally operate unactualized – just as the law of gravity operates
unactualized in your house until one day the roof falls down on your head.’ We
start wondering how to utilise the underlying mechanisms and get acquainted
with their limits. We start to comprehend what we must pay attention to when
we deal with the geographico-political outcomes and the object under study in
question.
In connection with what we have learned through our contextualisation and the
prudence we could acquire through unveiling the prevalent false believes, we are
able to think of alternative scenarios. This does not mean that we can predict
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how a future world on the geographico-political strata must and will look like
(since, as we saw, prediction is impossible in the social sciences). But we were
successful in transforming our false believes into novel knowledge, which gives
us a better idea about how the geographico-political structures in question tend
to operate. We became aware of the extent to which false believes have been
misguiding actions, and thus how the prevalent situation is consciously produced
and unconsciously reproduced by particular social forms.
At this stage, only we are aware that the prevalent believes about the geographico-
political topic in question are false – and maybe friends or colleagues we introduced to
our research. The next step, as claimed by Flyvbjerg especially, is to start dialoguing
about the discovery and hold the mirror up to society. This is when the scientists’
social responsibility comes into play. We must develop geographico-political scenarios
that will perpetuate, if we were to publish our ndings and the false believes were
dropped. This is comparable to some sort of utopian thinking. By doing so, we provide
alternatives for the future geographico-political world and, most importantly, prepare
society for future false believes – since the scenarios are most probably coupled with
false believes by and of themselves. Since structures of the geographico-political tend to
operate a particular way, we cannot predict what will happen, but by providing multiple
scenarios, our chances are higher to consider relevant ones.
In the social sciences, we cannot create closed systems to investigate the object under
study. And the strata we investigate are susceptible to false believes especially. Thus,
we are doomed to repeat the process above over and over again. The transformational
model of social activity tells us that social forms produce and reproduce the conditions
of their making. By pursuing transcendental phronetic political geography, we can
engage in this process and inuence it to some extent (see Figure 4.2 on page 76). Critical
realism, phronetic social science, and Lacoste’s Hérodotian school provide us both the
justication and the means to do so.
Now, let us take a closer look on some guidelines that will help to accomplish this
endeavour. In the previous chapter we have already grouped Flyvbjerg’s guidelines into
three categories: ontology, emancipation, and ethics. With these guidelines, Flyvbjerg
attempts to provide a tool set that allows critical and emancipatory research. Because
this goes along with what we attempt to argue for, it is worth considering. So, we
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will summarise and contextualise the categories in regard to what we learned in this
chapter.
In regard to ontology, Flyvbjerg demands to research close to reality, to study cases
and context, to emphasise ‘little things,’ and to move beyond agency and structure.
Researching close to reality can be achieved by self-reecting the own endeavours
permanently, and producing research that is socially valuable, according to Flyvbjerg.
This falls in line with Lacoste’s argument for the complexity of the geographico-political,
and the responsibility of geographers who address it. Pursuing the proposed research
programme, researchers appreciate that they can only grasp the empirical and must be
prudent about their thoughts. Simultaneously, they aim at disclosing false believes –
which is socially-valuable by nature (recall Bhaskar’s argument). By means of systemic
analysis and recognising that strata, thus scales, stand in relation, we open the possibility
to move beyond agency and structure and to emphasise little things. Overall, the pro-
posed research programme accepts the complexity of everything geographico-political
and provides options for proper investigations.
In context of emancipation, phronetic inquiry puts practice before discourse, requires
the researcher to do narrative, and to publish the research outcomes for the populace.
We criticised the rst guideline in the previous chapter, so let us adapt it to support the
purposes of the proposed approach. Rather than emphasising practice, we considered
practice and discourse as equally important since they are in a reciprocal relationship.
This also becomes visible in Bhaskar’s argument about transitive knowledge: It is not
only practice that forms our knowledge, but also what we think about what we think.
How we articulate what we think (in science) and how we discuss our knowledge with
others, forms new practices, transitive knowledge, and discourses.
The subsequent two guidelines demand to publish our research, and to do it in such
a way that it is accessible to the broader public. As a consequence, researchers must
actively raise awareness about their research. They are responsible to articulate what
they disclosed, as Lacoste claims. He also demonstrates how to do so by distributing
the journal Hérodote his way. He has been actively engaged with how geography is
understood and taught at universities. Only this way we can counter the perpetuation
of false believes in question. It is not sucient to disclose false believes, but necessary to
raise awareness about the fact that they are false. Otherwise they continue to perpetuate.
Let us now turn to the guidelines that are concerned with ethics: focusing on power
and values. We saw that Bhaskar and Flyvbjerg use the term ‘power’ dierently since
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Flyvbjerg is not aware of the three domains that Bhaskar developed. What Flyvbjerg
tries to achieve with the two guidelines is to engage in the positions, practices, and
relations of social forms. For him, values are socially and historically conditioned.
The argument goes that by developing an attitude that is based on a view supported
by society, the researcher is legitimised to put forward their attitude. In Bhaskar’s
transformational model of social activity, the aim is also to understand the relations
within which society produces and reproduces itself. According to him, production and
reproduction happen consciously and unconsciously respectively.
It stands to reason that power comes with assigning values to positions and practices
within society. The dominant and the dominated are who they are because we assign
particular values to their positions and practices, which, in turn, forms a particular
relation of power. Bhaskar sees the foundation for positions, practices, and relations in
(false) believes while Flyvbjerg sees them in values and powers. Thus, we see that both
Flyvbjerg and Bhaskar try to conceptualise the same thing.
From my point of view, Flyvbjerg’s conceptualisation is more elusive because it
is inherently connected to the idea that researchers must develop an attitude they
need to validate with the socially and historically conditioned context. If they did
so, they would again produce and reproduce what society values – maybe even false
believes. On the contrary, Bhaskar opens the possibility for a critical momentum by
tackling false believes. These believes are false because they do not correspond to what
our explanatory critique disclosed, and not because they do not represent a particular
attitude. They are, what Flyvbjerg assigns to tension points: ‘fraught with dubious
practices, contestable knowledge and potential conict’ (2012a, 288). While we can
see positions, practices, and relations through patterns of power, the only way to
stay critical, and provide research outcomes that can emancipate, is by showing that
prevailing believes are false.
Hence, to focus on values and power is important since they can disclose positions,
practices, and relations. Flyvbjerg agrees with Foucault that forms of resistance can
be an indicator for such relations. But to be able to claim that our research does not
rely on attitudes, we must focus our research on (false) believes too. In connection to
positions, practices, and relations, believes are necessary for relations of power to form.
By pursuing explanatory critiques, we can disclose believes and show that they are
false; question the prevailing practices, positions, and relations; and initiate change.
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4.4 What can we do with it? What is it for? What can it cause?
The purpose of transcendental phronetic political geography is to provide a base for
critical and emancipatory research that investigates everything geographico-political.
Transcendental realism and its implications for the social sciences legitimate, through
philosophical arguments, critical and emancipatory research in general. Flyvbjerg’s
accounts on phronetics provide a similar argument for the social sciences in particular
– independently from Bhaskar’s accounts – and contribute methodological guidance
on how to do so. Although Lacoste has been overlooking these ideas, he has been
providing substantial contributions to political geography that share a transcendental
realist understanding and pursue notions of phronesis. Since all of these approaches are
neglected and/or overlooked by political geographers, in this section we (a) assessed
their key ideas, (b) disclosed their anities, and (c) combined the ideas into a new
research approach.
The advantages of the approach to the prevalent approaches of the discipline lie at
hand. Since we can only discuss a fraction of what is debated in regard to meta-theory
in political geography, we consider the two most extreme examples: neorealism and
critical geopolitics (see Kofroň 2012). Neorealism is guided by a positivist attitude, thus
victim of the epistemic fallacy. Its ontology is at because the nation-state is the most
(if not the only) important agent. Thus, the approach fails to appreciate that the world
is stratied. Neorealism cannot pursue vertical explanation and cannot do justice to the
concerns about scale mentioned above. The approach does not include a spatial account.
While even more recent forms of realism such as neoclassical realism try to deal with
both local and global processes, they do not include a critical and/or emancipatory turn,
thus fail to justify researchers’ stance within society (for this approach see G. Rose 1998;
Taliaferro 2006). Not to mention that adapted versions of ‘realism’ in geography tend
to be de-formed to ‘GeoRealisms’ (see our discussion on Mäki and Oinas 2004).
While critical geopolitics focuses on the inuence of discourse on practice, it
struggles to provide arguments departing from spatial accounts. The approach fails to
describe the relation of discourse and the substantive world (see also Thrift 2000). Al-
though research pursued in virtue of the approach tends to include normative accounts,
it lacks philosophical reasoning to justify them. Last but not least, like neorealism,
critical geopolitics is based on a at ontology. The approach is based on transcendental
idealism, thus falls victim to the epistemic fallacy too.
This is not to say that transcendental phronetic political geography is ‘better’ or
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‘superior’ to the aforementioned approaches. A proper systemic analysis includes
an account of the processes that happen on the level of nation-states. Likewise it
includes an assessment of discourses that relate to the geograpico-political phenomena
in question. The proposed approach must be seen as overall umbrella that contextualises
such ndings. Nevertheless it is not limited to these approaches. Every attempt to
provide an explanatory critique of the prevailing believes and practices is legitimate;
the questions and guidelines mentioned above can help to do so.
While we discussed the usage of the approach only in relation to the objects under
study that relate to concepts of power, space, scale, and justice, the new approach might
also be applicable to other contexts. The aforementioned concepts are of special concern
for disciplines that investigate strata of the geographico-political, such as geopolitics.
Maybe it is also possible to adapt the approach for other strata.
Obviously, within the scope of a masters’ thesis, we can discuss the anities and
the combination of critical realism, phronetic social science, and Lacoste’s Hérodotian
school only incipiently. While we tried to consider key literature in regard to the three
approaches, it is more than possible that particular arguments within related debates
object to such a combination. Because there are massive amounts of literature for each
of them available, I am convinced that relevant arguments (objecting and supporting)
slipped through my hands. Nonetheless, during my research I did not come across
arguments that either support or object to the fusion of the approaches.
From the standpoint that we have discussed thus far, it is impossible to predict what
the proposed approach can cause once it is applied. The journey we made throughout the
last four chapters shares characteristics with transcendental phronetic inquiries by and
of itself. We disclosed false believes of meta-theoretical positions within geopolitics and
provided an alternative scenario for researching everything geographico-political. We
questioned the positions, practices, and relations of researchers in reference to society.
We objected to traditional accounts of causation, and raised arguments for tendencies
instead. Transcendental phronetic political geography tends to spur a reconsideration
of prevailing believes and pracices; an articulation of these insights to the populace;
an awareness about the tension points; and tends to initiate change. If the change will
create new tension points, the approach can disclose them. Thus, the approach sustains
the necessity of sciences that investigate the geographico-political strata.
* * *
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In this chapter we strengthened the argument for combining critical realism and phron-
etic social science; further, we supplemented ideas of the French school of géopolitiques
to spur a systemic analysis that is called ‘transcendental phronetic political geography.’
This approach is framed by four key questions:
1. What are the geographico-political phenomena of the object under study?
2. What must the geographico-political positions, practices, and relations be like
(what are they and how do they work) for these phenomena to perpetuate?
3. What must the (false) believes be like (what are they and how do they work) for the
positions, practices, and relations to be consciously produced and unconsciously
reproduced by society?
4. What would the geographico-political phenomena be like if we were to adopt
other believes instead?
Moreover, we argued that stratiction – and in this context horizontal and vertical
explanation – can help to develop a full-edged account of geographico-political re-
search that considers multiple scales. This way, we do justice to the complex ontology
of geographico-political phenomena. When we focus on values and power, and how
they inuence positions, practices, and relations within socio-spatial systems, we can
disclose false believes. In turn, disclosing and debating these believes helps to question
prevailing traditions and habits. The advantage of the approach is that it can act as an
umbrella term incorporating geographico-political research that is more encompassing
than traditional approaches while sustaining philosophical and methodological rigour.
The scope of the thesis provides us to deal with such an approach only initiatively.
In the following chapter, we will assess the proposed approach by epitomising its
application to the case of Cairo’s informal urban settlements.

Chapter 5
Getting the bigger picture of participatory
development in Cairo
Certainly, pursuing the developed approach for the Cairo case adequately would require
more space than this chapter can oer. While the approach enables us to contextualise
both holistic and analytical research; conducting such an attempt could ll an entire
masters’ thesis (if not a dissertation) on its own. Because of this, the chapter at hand can
address the situation in Cairo only incipiently. Nonetheless, the endeavour undertaken
here is crucial for transcendental phronetic political geography to hoist the sails. By
epitomising the situation in Cairo, we will see that vertical explanation is vital for
getting the bigger picture of any geographico-political phenomenon in question. The
substantive example shall help to clarify what has hitherto only been pursued in meta-
theory.
To recall, the original research question (How to improve the living conditions of
the ‘left-behind’ . . . ?) can be understood as addressing either the substantive or the
meta-theoretical level. In the course of this chapter, we will apply our argumentation
of the last chapter to the substantive concern of the question. I will provide a short
explanatory critique of how the improvement of the living conditions of the left-behind
in Cairo is addressed by various actors of dierent strata at the moment. To do so, the
chapter is divided into four sections, each addressing one of the questions that frame
transcendental phronetic political geography as developed in the previous chapter. Even
though the substantive discoveries are enlightening, the pursuit of this chapter is in
virtue of clarifying the meta-theoretical concern of the thesis.
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5.1 Cairo: an informal city embedded in planetary urbanisation
Let us rst acquire a general overview of the topic by answering the question: What
are the geographico-political phenomena of the object under study? In other words,
what becomes apparent to us in regard to informal urban settlements in Cairo?
First and foremost, recent work in urban studies appreciates that today’s form
of urbanisation is totally dierent from what we witnessed during the Industrial Re-
volution. It dissociates itself from ‘cityism’ and recognises that ‘cities are just a form
of urbanization’ (Gandy 2014). This not only implies that spaces outside the urban
fabric become ‘urban,’ but that the entire planet gets operationalised (Brenner 2014b).
According to this idea, the only deed of particular spaces is to function for other sites
around the world. This new form of urbanisation is called ‘planetary urbanisation’
(see contributions in Brenner 2014a, emphasis by me). Thus, local inequalities must
be understood as a symptom of a global process, and a clear dierentiation between
events of local and global processes crumbles.
While the aforementioned perspective stems from research within urban studies,
research of political geography also tends to question the demarcation of distinct scales
from another. We discussed these notions already in the previous chapter. In regard
to the case at hand, we can nd further contributions that challenge the city/state
dichotomy in particular (see Taylor 2000b, 2007; see also McCann and Ward 2010).
Here, authors question the supremacy of the nation-state over smaller entities. The
inuence of processes of the city-scale to stimulate global processes is more appreciated.
We saw that sovereignty must be reconsidered when accepting that dierent strata
are in relation of both composition and emergence. Thus, we can accept that there is
reciprocal inuence.
Spatially, the distinction between areas that work for the wealth of others and
areas that benet from it manifests in the omnipresence of informal urban settlements
world-wide. Davis (2004) speaks of a ‘planet of slums’ where negative examples of today,
such as Jakarta, Dhaka, Karachi, Shanghai, and Mumbai, will propagate in the near
future. Engelke (2013) mentions the accompanying concerns, such as environmental,
resource, climate, health, and human security. Informal urban settlements (or ‘slums’)
are where people, by claiming their space not formally but informally, struggle to get
a piece of the actions that happen through economic and diplomatic relations. These
come with planetary urbanisation.
Concerning Cairo for example, Davis mentions the growth of ‘slum cities in the
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air’ (2004, 13) because more and more people have started to create their shelter on
rooftops. Of the nearly 18 million people that live in Cairo more than 60 percent live in
informal urban areas (Sims 2010, 96; Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
2015). Informal urban settlements in Cairo are a known phenomenon as a thesis from
1981 shows (Siou 1981). In the last decades people have started to use arable land
for building their informal homes. The population of these households struggles to
ensure their daily necessities which makes poverty in Cairo underestimated (Sabry
2010). Nevertheless, they have become known as contributing their part of solving the
national housing crisis while the government is infamous for neglecting their needs
(El-Batran and Arandel 1998). In this context urban segregation has been an ubiquitous
phenomenon of Cairo’s history (Abdelbaseer 2015).
We may not forget that Cairo is an informal city embedded in Egypt, a semi-
authoritarian state (see also Hassan 2011). With this in mind, it is not surprising that
the state has been reluctant to make any eorts mapping or measuring the extension
of their capital’s informal housing by itself. Rather, it has relied on the investigations
undertaken by third parties (see Sims 2010, 97). While each governor, that is, the po-
sition that is responsible for the city-scale, controls an ‘important center of political
power’ (253), the entire structure is controlled by the president. Only recently, this
president has become ‘acutely aware of the negative security implications of informal
settlements’ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2015, 2).
Since 1998 a German company that conducts development co-operation called Gesell-
schaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ) – formerly known as Gesellschaft
für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GTZ) – has been engaged with the informal
urban settlements of Cairo (see Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 2003).
On behalf of the German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, the
association has been engaged in two projects called ‘Participatory Urban Manage-
ment Programme’ (1998-2003) and ‘Participatory Development Programme in Urban
Areas’ (2004-2018) to achieve the following objective (Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit Egypt 2015; see also Piero 2009, 14; Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit 2015):
Public administration and civil society organisations [of Cairo] collaborate in improving
services and environmental conditions for the poor urban population.
In the most recently available evaluation report, the project claims to be active on the
national, regional, and local level (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2015).
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The evaluation says that the project applies a ‘multi-actor and multi-level approach’
by collaborating with ‘citizens, civil society organisations, private sector companies
and local administration.’ In 2014, it has founded the Ministry of Urban Renewal and
Informal Settlements (MURIS) of Cairo and continuously provides grants to ‘local
leaders’ and governorates, according to the report. In the project’s current phase (2010-
2018), it has raised funding of roughly 50 million Euros while nearly 40 million Euros
stem from contributions of the European Union. The document describes the situation
as follows (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2015):
The size of the nine selected informal areas, their inadequate supply with infrastructure
and services as well as the lacking capacity of the local administration to develop and
implement participatory processes, are equally indicative of the high relevance of the
programme.
Hence, the Participatory Development Programme deals with the global problematic
of planetary urbanisation in particular parts of Cairo, Egypt. On the site, there are fun-
damentally dierent types of actors involved: the local population that is ‘left-behind;’
the local population that co-operates with donors directly; Gesellschaft für internationale
Zusammenarbeit Egypt, that is the Egyptian branch of the German association; the main
branch of the organisation in Germany; the German ministry, the European Union,
the Egyptian Ministries; the Egyptian state; and others. Thus, we deal with national,
supranational, and non-governmental actors that claim sovereignty on a variety of
scales. It is a very complex system of power relations.
5.2 Development co-operation: an enmeshment of geographico-
political phenomena
Now, let us disclose the prevailing circumstances that are responsible for what just
became apparent to us. What must the geographico-political positions, practices, and
relations be like (what are they and how do they work) for the aforementioned aspects
to perpetuate? Generally speaking, there must be someone who has and someone who
needs. This is a very complex system of relations and comes with certain impasses.
Mutual dependency makes aid unpredictable because beneciaries try to acquire
the best oer they can grab, and donor countries try to serve the best oer they
can contribute while both compete with many other competitors that try to do the
same (Canavire-Bacarreza, Neumayer and Nunnenkamp 2015). In context of bilateral
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development co-operation, the prevailing power relations are set in stone because of
loose accountability (Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall 2004, 47). To the greater extent,
the donor organisation is bounded to its home country than to the country it delivers
aid to, because the home country is where the money comes from.
The aspects just mentioned make it less surprising that ocial development assist-
ance has been increasing greatly while country programmable aid has been decreasing
(see Kharas 2007). While the relations between donor organisations and their home
countries is carved in stone, whether the provided resources actually reach the bene-
ciaries remains an open question. If the beneciaries are embedded within a political
system that tends to reject the importance of developing its nation, the prospects are
even worse. Yet, donor countries often miss the impact that the political structure of the
receiving country has. The conference on aid eectiveness held in Busan has shown
that there has been no progress made recognising this concern (Booth 2012).
What is taken into consideration though, are geopolitical aspects (Alesina and Dollar
2000; see also Berthélemy 2006). Generally, countries tend to receive more resources if
they have a colonial past, are open to trade, and democratic. This makes the high amount
of aid that ows to Egypt in comparison to other countries even more surprising. ‘Being
Egypt,’ as Alesina and Dollar (2000, 40) puts it ironically, is a characteristic of a country
that can increase oerings by more than 400 percent. This signicantly high support
that Egypt receives originates from a variety of countries, which includes Germany
among others. While Alesina does not mention specic geopolitical interests that could
explain this signicance, it stands to reason that Egypt’s geostrategic position, such as
controlling the Suez canal, is one aspect. These reasons ease overlooking authoritarian
leaders (see further Sparrow 2016).
For a development project to reduce poverty, three premisses must be met, according
to Devas (2001): First, the project must be embedded within a system that considers votes
of the poor. Second, a framework must exist that enables the government to address
the needs. Third, the society that is aected must be dynamic, claiming their rights.
Hence, the Participatory Development Programme must challenge the authoritarian
regime in Egypt. If it cannot change the regime, votes will not be considered; whether
an appropriate framework is implemented will remain questionable; and the society
will be hindered in claiming their rights. In this context, the recent revolts are only a
drop in the ocean (see Wiarda 2012). Moreover, as we will see in the next section, the
programme fails to establish both an institutional framework for the impoverished to
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raise their voice and give them a choice.
5.3 When (false) believes serve self-preservation
So, what must the (false) believes be like for the aforementioned positions, practices,
and relations to be consciously produced and unconsciously reproduced by society?
Let us rst summarise what we just saw. Generally speaking, there is evidence that
participatory development co-operation is doomed to fail in Egypt. Here, ‘failing’
means, while the actions of the association have some impact, they do not spur what
participatory development tries to encourage: an empowerment and improvement of the
living conditions of those impoverished. Nonetheless, we saw that the German state and
the European Union continue their engagement in this type of fostering development.
Funding continues and the association started a follow-up project. So we can assume
that some form of misinformation prevails. According to Balbo, there is considerable
evidence that statistics about the performance of development are embellished (2013,
278):
As it has ironically been stressed, UN statisticians succeeded overnight where governments,
aid agencies, nance institutions and NGOs had failed for decades, pulling out of their
miserable housing conditions tens of millions of slum dwellers.
While the overall narrative goes that globalisation and economic interdependence
generates prosperity for everyone, it is based on the opinion and statistical hegemony
of a few (Wade 2004).
Likewise, participation in development co-operation is actually full of paradoxes.
As an investigation of participatory approaches in Mumbai has shown, it is not the
poor who benet but ‘inuential community members, small private entrepreneurs and
middlemen’ (Zérah 2009). While the – in comparison – already powerful gain additional
power, labour becomes even more informalised. Because, instead of providing particip-
ation, non-governmental organisation can often only provide technical infrastructure
through sub-contracts, the positions of already established individuals are strengthened,
and the poor remain poor. As a matter of fact, similar experiences are also made in
Dar es Salaam (see Dill 2009). Rather than empowering those in need, the creation
of community-based organisations lead to their exclusion. In this case, one of the
paradoxes is the false believe of donors that if participatory attempts are legitimised on
the national scale, they can also nd legitimacy locally. Another is the false believe that
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organising local groups creates platforms for the neglected. In fact neither is the case,
as the two examples show. Moreover, as has been stressed elsewhere, such ‘localism’
belittles local inequalities, prevailing power relations, and the geopolitical interests we
discussed above (Mohan and Stokke 2000).
What is the situation like in Cairo? While the German association has been interpret-
ing the local circumstances unidirectionally by focusing on the miserable situation of
informal urban settlements (see for example Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammen-
arbeit Egypt 2013, 2015; Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2016), David
Sims underlines the positive sides of the settlements and contests ‘stereotypical gener-
alizations that many are quick to apply to Third World megacities’ (Sims 2010, 1; see
further Sanyal 2015; cf. Davis 2004). Since competition is high and living conditions
challenging, citizens of both informal and formal housings struggle for a ‘decent liveli-
hood’ (Sims 2010, 119). In fact, the income inequality between residents of informal and
formal areas is low (111). Since poverty is also a problem in formal areas, the poor who
live in informal areas benet from much more aordable housing. In addition, informal
areas are much more secure because there dominate personal ties between residents
and the city is less anonymous. It stands to reason that we cannot simply impose our
Northern conception of cities on Southern cities. Informality can be a pragmatic way
of dealing with any housing situation (see also Watson 2009). This is not to drop the
concerns about informal settlements but to stimulate a more rened debate about the
geographico-political situation there.
Before we investigate the programme in Cairo in more detail, let us contextualise
what we discussed thus far. We see that donors tend to overlook – consciously or
unconsciously – their great dependence on the political structure of the receiving
country for their measurements to actually achieve what they intend to. Especially in
regard to participatory development co-operation, scholars have raised the concern
that such implementations are accompanied by paradoxes. In the Egyptian case, the
association involved bolsters the necessity for their actions and informs about the site
unidirectionally.
While the most recent evaluation of the project in question concludes that the
project is ‘rather successful’ (ironically, conducted by the association itself), Elena
Piero’s assessment of the situation is devastating (Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit 2015; Piero 2009). Why is that? According to her, ‘participatory
development is aimed at giving a voice and a choice to the voiceless and “choice-less”’
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and is ‘better considered as a highly political methodology of empowerment’ (Piero
2009, 180, 186). In accordance with other academics, she saw a concern in promoting
participation, which is inevitably linked to a democratisation process, in a country that
is in a grey zone between authoritarianism and democratisation. Between January 2006
and December 2008 she has conducted her research focusing on three aspects: the form
of participation that has been promoted; who has been empowered through the eorts
taken by the project; and whether the project could enhance good governance.
According to her, not only has there been a general misunderstanding of what
‘participation’ means, but the great amount of negative lessons learned from the pre-
ceding project were not taken into consideration when the team started to implement
the follow-up project (181). In most cases, the grants that were given to local non-
governmental organisations helped them to implement their ‘hidden agendas’ and
worked for their own interest instead of the overall aim of the Participatory Development
Programme (182).
Like the other cases mentioned, participation rather leads to the empowerment
of the already empowered. She notes that, by addressing informal urban areas, it is
not necessarily the poor who benet from a development programme that focuses on
informal urban areas. This is because such areas are much more heterogene. Often, the
residents that beneted from the measurements by the programme were those that had
enough ‘political connection’ and had already established their stance in a locality in
question. Both the preceding and the follow-up project currently running performed
poorly because they neither reached the people in need nor provided satisfactory
awareness of the project itself in its areas. Instead of empowering the weak, the
programme managed to empower ‘already powerful groups’ and ‘[p]ower relationships
were left by and large untouched’ (184). This is due to the ‘absence of any socio-political
movement or counter-élite able to endorse and appropriate the transformative project
attached to participation-as-empowerment’ because it ‘nullied the “democratising”
potential intrinsic to participation’ (184). (We will discuss this aspect from the critical
realist standpoint in more detail in the next section.)
Piero concludes that the given political environment would have doomed any local
development project to fail. While there could be achieved some success in terms of
infrastructural upgrading, this success is not at all related to any achievements providing
participation. Instead, the participatory approach of the programme strengthened
existing political structures by ‘calm[ing] down’ the poor (184-6). Thus Piero (2009,
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177) sees the project as
a rather self-referential project which is talking to itself about itself and is producing a
huge amount of documentation clarifying the project’s assumptions without analysing
their practical eects.
While Piero’s dissertation is publicly available on the project’s website, the teaser
of the upload remains doubtful since it neither assesses nor comments on the ndings.1
Similar deciencies are visible when taking a closer look on the most recent evalu-
ation of the project. The evaluation by Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(2015, 3) itself rates the project ‘rather successful’ taking into consideration the following
concern (3):
As far as the comparison of the current status of the PDP to the projected targets in
concerned, one has to take into consideration that this evaluation of the programme
represents something like a mid-term review, as the implementation period of the actual
phase is still on-going until the end of 2018. This evaluation can thus only show the
current state of implementation.
The fact that the evaluation is conducted within a particular phase notwithstanding,
we may not forget that the project itself has been running for more than 15 years. That
is, the given excuse is questionable.
In regard to the project’s impact, the report concludes that the ‘small- and medium-
scale upgrading measures started with a delay’ and that the ‘committees of inhabitants
in the target areas’ are ‘currently inactive.’ In this context the report prospects that the
poor population ‘will be strengthened’ (5). In general, when evaluating the impact that
any project had, there is no space for the future tense. Taking the amount of funding
and time into concern, the population should have already been strengthened.
On the same page, the report claims that the ‘impact will be enhanced’ and that
‘[f]unding reaches the target population directly.’ But it admits that it could not im-
plement the participatory measures because of the ‘volatile political and institutional
environment.’ The evaluation continues:
1. ‘Elena Piero’s PhD thesis with the title “What Happened to Participation? Urban Development and
Authoritarian Upgrading in Cairo’s Informal Neighbourhoods” is based on sound empirical evidence and a
fascinating reading for anyone interested in Cairo and in the contradictions between development theories
and practices. Her analysis follows three sets of questions: the rst set regards the way ‘participation’ has
been interpreted and concretised by PUMP and PDP. The second is about the emancipating potential of the
‘participatory approach’ and its ability to ‘empower’ the ‘marginalised’. The third focuses on one hand on
the ecacy of GIZ strategy to lead to an improvement of the delivery service in informal areas (especially
in terms of planning and policies), and on the other hand on the potential of GIZ development intervention
to trigger an incremental process of ‘democratisation’ from below.’ (Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit Egypt 2009)
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Due to the current political volatility, it is however impossible to predict whether this will
allow the programme sustainably strengthen an agenda for inclusive urban development.
[. . .] The sustainability of the programme’s impacts cannot yet be ensured at the moment
due to the volatile circumstances.
Thus, in accordance to what we learned about participatory development, we
can agree with Piero that the project is doomed to fail and far from being ‘rather
successful.’ The political environment makes the implementation of a participatory
approach impossible. But the problem is that the persons in charge falsely believe
– consciously or unconsciously – that their pursuit is successful. They hold on to a
sinking ship, refraining to admit that it leaks.
My greatest concern is that, not only does the project fail to help, but it even worsens
the situation. As we already discussed, projects of this type tend to strengthen the
already powerful. Piero concluded the same for the project in question. Moreover,
accepting the implementation of a participatory programme can bolster the image of
the authoritarian leader. It gives leverage to claim that, while the situation for the poor
is miserable, measurements are taken to improve the situation.
Concluding, the geographico-political situation in Cairo is full of false believes.
Informal urban settlements – especially in Cairo – are much more heterogene than
expected. Localism is not the key to success. And even established development projects
do not necessarily implement what they are expected to. Rather, they try to sustain
false believes for self-preservation.
5.4 Scenarios for reconsidering participatory development inCairo
Let us now conclude this chapter by answering the following question: What would the
geographico-political phenomena be like if we were to adopt other believes instead?
Since the arguments provided here only represent the very beginning of a transcendental
phronetic inquiry of the geographico-political situation around informal settlements in
Cairo, the following arguments must be taken with a grain of salt.
First and foremost, simply dropping the measurements that are conducted is not
a solution. As we have seen, the project is enmeshed in a variety of geographico-
political processes. If the European Union and the other guarantors were to stop their
engagement, consequences will perpetuate from the local to the global scale, most
probably these will be dicult to get hold of. Our concern should be to challenge the
false believes, trying to diminish them.
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Second, the greatest problem I see is the great opacity that prevails in regard to the
funding that the projects receives. While we can acquire the project’s total amount of
funding, we cannot assess the exact measurements and how much they cost. We must
rely on the vague evaluations by GIZ that serve self-preservation.
In a request under the regulation regarding the right to access documents by the
European Parliament, Council, and Commission (see European Parliament and Council
of the European Union 2001), I tried to acquire, among other documents, the Financing
Agreement between the European Union and Egypt (see Baudet von Gersdor 2015).
After nearly one year, I remain without success. While I was able to acquire some
documents, the email conversation reveals that it is a tedious process. Although I could
refer to documents by their reference number, the entire process was complicated by
the oce that responded to my request.
Third, development co-operations are mainly accountable to the donor entity, so
if the public has no means to check both the co-operations and the donors, these will
work for their self-preservation.
In the case in question, this is also due to the corporate structure of the association
conducting the programme. While there are many structures dened, ‘GmbH’ is the
most prominent one in Germany: it is used for private limited companies. There also
exists a similar structure called ‘gGmbH’ that is used for non-prot organisations. Since
GIZ is a GmbH, it is a company that aims at maximising their prot. Not only does
this undermine any charitable approach, it protects the company from any request
about the measurements that are conducted because they are intra-company. While
state-owned organisations must justify their expenses, private organisations of this
type are more dicult to control.
There is already produced a great amount of documentation. If organisations were
to make these documents public, the wider public could engage in a discourse about
how to enhance the conducted measurements. If the processes were more transparent,
this would not necessarily lead to an abandonment of projects but would spur critical
assessment by third parties. Resources would be allocated more ecient. Participatory
development would benet. And even if participatory approaches were stopped in
authoritarian countries entirely, other measurements, such as infrastructural improve-
ments could be undertaken. These, at least, would not empower the already powerful
and worsen the status quo.
* * *
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In this chapter, we assessed the proposed research approach on the case in Cairo. We
saw that the case in question represents a situation where a variety of actors are involved
that stem from and deal with multiple scales of the same concern. In this context we
epitomised that development co-operation is enmeshed in a variety of geographico-
political phenomena. We witnessed the consequences that (false) believes can have:
they are used to justify prevailing but highly questionable actions. At the end we gave
some perspective on how the false believes can be put under scrutiny for developing
alternative practices.
I highly question the measurements of the Participatory Development Programme
in Urban Areas. Nonetheless, I underline the necessity to engage in informal urban
settlements world-wide because people suer and we must take the security concerns
seriously. Thus, we must improve the prevailing frameworks and disclose the prevailing
believes. Certainly, if transcendental phronetic political geography was conducted in
this case completely, the argumentation above would need to be published, and I would
try to stimulate a debate about the concerns mentioned. Writing this thesis is the rst
step. Hopefully, further steps will follow.
Conclusion
On a journey from the most abstract to the most concrete the thesis shows that – des-
pite prevalent ontological, epistemological and methodological concerns – political
geography can suce the purpose of a critical and emancipatory endeavour that pro-
duces socially valuable outcomes without neglecting neither philosophical nor scientic
rigour. In this context, it can and must overcome disciplinary boundaries and engage
in phenomena that perpetuate on multiple scales. Thus, if pursued as outlined in the
thesis, research that investigates geographico-political processes can actively change
dubious socio-spatial practices for the better. Following this, social scientists become
decisive actors for sustaining the well-being of what they study.
The thesis departs from the naive yet urgent question how we can improve the
living conditions of those that remain left-behind on our increasingly urbanised planet.
While the question can be read on the substantive level, the thesis reads it on the
meta-theoretical level. The prevalent ontological and epistemological uncertainties of
social sciences result in inquiries that tend to either refrain from producing normat-
ive conclusions or suer from distancing themselves from the substantive level. To
overcome these meta-theoretical doubts we need to hoist the sails toward forgotten
meta-theoretical territory.
The research is a guidepost toward sound argumentation why political geography
can indeed incorporate normative momentum, and shows how to connect geographico-
political disciplines to reality. Here, the greatest dilemma is to nd a balance between
a suitable ontological standpoint that can incorporate the elusiveness of the object
under study, and epistemological and methodological guidelines that prevent ‘anything
goes approaches’ but provide an adequate way to produce socially-relevant research
outcomes.
The original research question was translated into three meta-theoretical ques-
tions that are answered. First, how can academia translate concerns about prevalent
geographico-political phenomena into substantive actions? Academia (that includes
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the discipline of political geography) can produce substantive actions by focusing on
prevalent positions, practices, and relations within social systems and by disclosing
false believes that are connected to them. Here, the focus on values and power is
essential. Stratication, as conceptualised by critical realism, further requires us to
pursue horizontal and vertical explanations on dierent scales. Academia can stimulate
that misguided actions are abandoned by formulating its ndings for the populace.
Second, how can academia legitimate a normative momentum in their research
outcomes? Academia can legitimate a normative momentum by relying on the core
tenets of critical realism. The concept of stratied freedom makes every social entity
a responsible actor that can and must engage with the world that they aect. In fact,
academia has lost sight of these notions, neglected phronesis, and focused too much on
episteme, and techne as re-conceptualised in phronetic social science.
And third, how can academia ascertain whether the proposed measurements will
actually improve and not impair the situation addressed? While nobody can predict
whether the informed populace will rather improve than impair the situation in the
short run, critical realism and phronetics provide arguments why it will in the long
run. If truth is articulated well and its spread is sustained, it will survive and guide
practices that spur improvement. Researchers must develop scenarios to be prepared
for the impact that such novel knowledge might have. To evaluate the impact of future
practices on dierent administrative levels, the French school of géopolitiques provides
a method to contextualise how geographico-political phenomena of dierent scales are
related.
The responses rely on critical realism, phronetic social science, and the French
school of géopolitiques. Each of the approaches engages with a dierent feature of the
aforementioned uncertainty. The rst, a philosophy located in-between the radical
standpoints of the eld describes a third way between neopositivism and postmod-
ernism by developing a distinct philosophical ontology. Since human geography has
distorted the critical realist philosophy to some form of ‘GeoRealism’ (Mäki and Oinas
2004) at the expense of exibility, the thesis focuses on critical realism’s original core.
The second, phronetic social science, is an emancipatory method of social inquiry.
It contributes epistemological answers and demands substantive outcomes in social
inquiries, but lacks both a suitable ontology and an account on spatiality. The third,
the French school around géopolitiques, is an unappreciated but substantive tradition
within political geography. The tradition aims at contributing spatial knowledge for
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society to emancipate. Since ‘everything is geopolitical’ (Mamadouh 1998, 239), the
approach has developed a systemic approach to deal with socio-political processes and
inequalities that perpetuate over multiple scales: from local, national, supranational to
global. If considered separately, the three approaches cannot satisfyingly engage with
the uncertainty in question, but their combination is highly auspicious.
Thus, the thesis outlines key tenets of a research programme that incorporates their
most insightful characteristics. The programme is more encompassing than popular
scientic strategies while sustaining philosophical and methodological rigour. Strategies
such as neopositivism and poststructuralism both suer from a at ontology. At the
same time neopositivism refrains from inciting normative research outcomes that are
socially relevant; and poststructuralism cannot connect its accounts on discourse to the
substantive level of social-spatial practice.
By pursuing the aforementioned guidelines for the Participatory Development Pro-
gramme in Cairo, Egypt, the thesis assesses the approach incipiently. This way it
underlines the necessity for similar research. It shows that development co-operation is
enmeshed in a variety of geographico-political phenomena that are sustained by false
believes. Moreover, by contextualising research that is indirectly and directly connected
to the case in question, the thesis argues that the current framework of the development
project (and participatory development in general) must be reconsidered.
Certainly, within the scope of a master’s thesis, the arguments above can only
be pursued to limited extent. In this context, the following are the most important
concerns: The text at hand only incorporates the most central aspects of critical realism
and neglects more recent accounts. While it is important to reconsider the core tenets,
it would be interesting to assess whether new insights are compatible or incompatible
with the proposed approach. Likewise, I suspect that noteworthy arguments can be
found in adaptations of critical realism for other disciplines. In regard of phronetic social
science, the research only relies on secondary literature concerned with the Foucauldian
concept of power and Aristotle’s ideas on phronesis. Here it is of special concern to
further scrutinise the ability of the concepts to engage in spatial contexts. In regard to
the French school, the thesis mainly investigates key text by Hérodote’s founder Yves
Lacoste. Other scholars of the tradition and further contributions should be consulted
for explicitly realist ideas or accounts on phronetics. In addition, concepts that are of
special relevance for the approach, such as power, space, scale, and justice, must be
related to transcendental phronetic political geography with greater detail. Moreover,
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the ideas could probably gain further momentum by connecting them to related debates
within political philosophy. Last but not least, further eorts must be taken to disclose
false believes within development co-operation – not only in connection to the situation
in Cairo, but in general. This includes my duty to continue researching on the case in
question and publish the results in the mass media.
These deciencies notwithstanding, the thesis presents central ideas for research
within political geography that aims to actively engage in how humanity structures its
living space. I hope to have contributed to the development of a socio-spatial discipline
that remains driven by its responsibility.
Abstract
Although an increasing number of donors try to improve the living conditions
of inhabitants in informal urban settlements, some studies show that only a very
limited amount of provided resources reach those impoverished. The inability of
projects to change the situation for the better could point to dubious practices.
Despite academia trying to produce socially relevant work, it has failed to translate
its criticism into actions at the substantive level. Researchers are perturbed from
engaging because of meta-theoretical concerns in regard to normativity, among
others. The study scrutinises this dilemma and proposes a solution. It recon-
siders the core of critical realism and enhances its metaphysical accounts with
epistemological ones from both phronetic social science and the French school of
géopolitiques. It argues that political geography can challenge dubious practices in
the socio-spatial world without losing neither philosophical nor scientic rigour.
The ideas are assessed in a short study on a development project in Cairo, Egypt,
demonstrating their applicability and usefulness.
Keywords: philosophy of science – critical realism – phronetic social science
– phronesis – Yves Lacoste – géopolitiques – power – space – scale – justice –
normativity – poverty reduction
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